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Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for 
Posse Comitatus 
Nathan Canestaro* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whoever, except in cases under circumstances expressly 
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully 
uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or 
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined [under this title] or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.1 
Since its enactment in 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act (“PCA”) has 
upheld a basic value of American democracy—the principle that the 
military cannot enforce civilian law. This principle, derived from a 
long tradition of antimilitarism in English common law, represents 
the “traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military 
intrusion into civilian affairs.”2 Despite its status as a “fundamental 
tenet of our system of law,”3 the PCA has lain in obscurity for much 
of its existence. Derided by one court as an “obscure and all-but-
forgotten statute,”4 and “backwash of the Reconstruction period,”5 its 
criminal sanctions have never been enforced during its 120-year 
history. In the limited number of cases where the PCA has undergone 
judicial review, it has often appeared in defense attorneys’ creative—
 
 * Counterterrorist Center, Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 2002. Previously assigned 
to CIA’s Afghanistan Task Force and DCI Interagency Balkan Task Force. J.D., University of 
Tennessee, 2001. 
 This material has been reviewed by CIA. That review neither constitutes CIA 
authentication of information nor implies its endorsement of the author’s views. 
 1. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982). 
 2. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). 
 3. People v. Burden, 288 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). 
 4. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948). 
 5. Id.  
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and almost entirely unsuccessful—motions to contest the 
prosecution’s jurisdiction, to suppress evidence, or to invalidate 
government action.  
The effectiveness of the PCA has declined over the course of the 
last thirty years. Legislative pressure, a lack of judicial enforcement, 
and numerous exceptions have taken their toll on the PCA’s strength. 
An increased public confidence in the military and judicial deference 
to military actions have undermined the principles upon which the 
PCA was founded. Accordingly, this has increased the Department of 
Defense’s (“DoD”) legal freedom to domestically intervene. In the 
wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the military’s place 
in homeland security has become a major national issue. Even before 
the attacks, the DoD played a major supporting role in counter-drug 
efforts and in formulating a response to potential chemical or 
biological terrorist attacks. Since the attacks, the military has 
dramatically widened the scope of its domestic activities. For the first 
time, combat aircraft patrolled the skies over major American cities 
while uniformed troops stood guard in the nation’s airports. The 
troops and jets have now been withdrawn. Yet the creation of a new 
military command for the sole purpose of homeland defense indicates 
the intention of the armed forces to remain engaged in that role.  
With the groundswell of public support for the war against 
terrorism, the decay of posse comitatus has accelerated dramatically. 
Some politicians and media sources now suggest that Congress 
amend or even repeal the PCA to allow a degree of domestic military 
involvement that would have been unthinkable five years ago.6 
Although there is undoubtedly a certain pragmatism in levying the 
immense resources of the U.S. military against the threat of domestic 
terrorism, this strategy ignores the consequences of using soldiers as 
a substitute for civilian law enforcement. The military is not a police 
force; it is trained to engage and destroy the enemy, not to protect 
constitutional rights. The founding fathers feared the involvement of 
the Army in the nation’s affairs for good reason. History has 
demonstrated that employing soldiers to enforce the law is inherently 
dangerous to the rights of the people. 
 
 
 6. See War Prompts Debate on Military Law: Posse Comitatus Act of 1878 Bans Use of 
Troops for Many Actions on U.S. Soil, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, Nov. 11, 2001, at 39. 
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This Article will prove that the “War on Terrorism” will 
undermine the PCA. The “War on Drugs” has already eroded the 
PCA, but the “War on Terrorism” could be fatal to it. First, this 
Article will examine the roots of the principle of posse comitatus in 
English Common Law, and in the context of Colonial America and 
the post-Reconstruction period. This Article will establish that a 
separation of the civil and military spheres, specifically by 
prohibiting the military’s enforcement of civil law, is a fundamental 
value upon which the United States was founded. It will show how 
this prohibition has been slowly eroding since early in this nation’s 
history. Focusing on the civil abuses of posse comitatus during the 
Reconstruction period will demonstrate the consequences of 
unchecked domestic military power.  
Next, this Article will turn to the 1981 and 1988 Drug War 
amendments to the PCA to show that Congress has demonstrated its 
intent to levy the military’s resources against society’s problems, 
even over the DoD’s objections to extend their duties beyond their 
role as the nation’s “warfighter.” This Article will then examine each 
of the exceptions to the PCA to prove that substantial exceptions 
have seriously weakened it. Building on narrow judicial 
interpretations of the PCA, Congress has responded to modern 
national security threats such as drugs, terrorism, and weapons of 
mass destruction by giving the military a substantial support role. 
Beginning with the Wounded Knee standoff of 1973, the amount of 
military assistance that the PCA permits has risen dramatically. 
Meanwhile, the courts have been extremely reluctant to enforce 
violations to expand its scope beyond criminal sanctions. Finally, this 
Article will analyze the military’s growing role in homeland defense, 
and explore the consequences of the decline of posse comitatus.  
II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF POSSE COMITATUS 
A. English Common Law 
A Standing Army, however necessary it may be at some times, 
is always dangerous to the Liberties of the People. Soldiers are 
apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of 
the Citizens. They have their Arms always in their hands . . . 
 Washington University Open Scholarship
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They soon become attached to their officers and disposed to 
yield implicit obedience to their Commands. Such a power 
should be watched with a jealous Eye.7 
The term posse comitatus translates to “power of the county,”8 
derived from the Roman practice of allowing an entourage of citizens 
to escort proconsuls as they traveled to their places of duty.9 In the 
Anglo-American legal tradition, this principle stretches back to the 
Thirteenth-Century English antimilitary sentiment.10 At that time, 
sheriffs and magistrates upheld the civil peace with the assistance of 
the jurata ad arma, a pool of free men on whom they relied upon for 
help.11  
Founded in the Twelfth Century under the Assize of Arms, the 
jurata ad arma composed of every able-bodied male over the age of 
fifteen,12 and served primarily as a civilian military reserve until the 
Fourteenth Century.13 The transition of its role from military to law 
enforcement came as a response to the increasing reliance of English 
monarchs to enforce the law by force under a declaration of martial 
law. Under such a declaration, the King would assert his authority on 
the grounds of necessity, and suspend civil authority while employing 
the military to maintain order.14 
 
 7. Letter from Samuel Adams to Joseph Warren (Jan. 7, 1776) (on file with the 
Massachusetts Historical Society, Collections, LXII-LXXIII, Boston, MA), reprinted in 
RICHARD H. KOHN, THE EAGLE AND SWORD: THE BEGINNINGS OF THE MILITARY 
ESTABLISHMENT IN AMERICA 2 (1975). 
 8. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1183 (7th ed. 1999). 
 9. Major H.W.C. Furman, Restrictions Upon Use of the Army Imposed By the Posse 
Comitatus Act, 7 MIL. L. REV. 85, 87 (1960). 
 10. WILLIAM O. DOUGLAS, THE RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE 112 (1972). 
 11. David E. Engdahl, Soldiers, Riots, and Revolution: The Law and History of Military 
Troops in Civil Disorders, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1, 4 (1971) [hereinafter Engdahl, Soldiers]. 
 12. “For purposes of keeping the domestic peace, [the members of the jurata ad arma] 
were aides to the sheriff subject to the King’s ordinary courts, and governed by the rules of 
developing common law. In this . . . capacity the jurata ad arma came to be known in the next 
several centuries as the posse comitatus.” Id. at 5. See also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1162 
(6th Ed. 1990).  
 13. Engdahl, Soldiers, supra note 11, at 5. 
 14. David E. Engdahl, Foundations for Military Intervention in the United States, 7 U. 
PUGET SOUND L. REV. 1 (1983), reprinted in MILITARY INTERVENTION IN DEMOCRATIC 
SOCIETIES 6 (Peter J. Rowe & Christopher J. Whelan eds., 1985) [hereinafter Engdahl, Military 
Intervention]. 
 https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol12/iss1/7
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Under Kings James I and Charles I, troops were quartered in 
private homes, courts staged summary trials, and brutal military force 
suppressed civil unrest.15 In 1628, Parliament’s Petition of Right 
protested the use of military tribunals to try civilians by the Tudor 
and Stuart monarchs, arguing it was improper under the Magna 
Carta’s provision that no man would be taken, imprisoned, or killed 
except “by the law of the land.”16 The Crown’s continued use of 
martial law, however, sparked the English Civil War in 1642. The 
military tyranny of the Cromwell regime further ingrained upon the 
English public the dangers of a standing army.17  
By the Restoration, the public feared the military so much that “no 
standing army . . . became the watchword of all parties.”18 In 
response, Parliament drafted the Bill of Rights in 1689, declaring 
“that the raising or keeping [of] a standing army within the 
Kingdome in time[s] of peace, unless it be with the consent of 
Parliament, is against law.”19 This Bill echoed the terms of the Magna 
Carta and Petition of Right, stating that the use of the military to 
enforce order is not due process of law.20 It also struck new ground 
by placing the army under the strict control of the legislature.21 
The Riot Act’s passage in 1714 further bolstered these safeguards 
against military intervention. The Riot Act required the sheriff to 
order a crowd to disperse before employing force against it.22 Only 
after this requirement was satisfied could the sheriff call the posse 
comitatus, consisting of “all his Majesty’s subjects of age and 
ability,” to restore the peace.23 In contrast, the Riot Act strictly 
forbade employing the army in this same role, as the military force 
was solely reserved for suppressing open rebellion.24 
 
 15. Id. See also Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 92 (1866); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 
U.S. 304, 320 (1946). 
 16. DOUGLAS, supra note 10, at 111. 
 17. Id. at 113. 
 18. Id. at 113. 
 19. Id. at 112. 
 20. Engdahl, Military Intervention, supra note 14, at 6. 
 21. John D. Gates, Don’t Call Out the Marines: An Assessment of the Posse Comitatus 
Act, 13 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1467, 1470 (1982). 
 22. Engdahl, Soldiers, supra note 11, at 16-17. 
 23. Id. at 17 (quoting 1 Geo. 1, Stat. 2.C.5 (1714)). 
 24. Engdahl, Military Intervention, supra note 14, at 7. 
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Although English common law much honored the principle of 
posse comitatus, the circumstances surrounding the Gordon Riots of 
June 2, 1780 marked the beginning of its erosion. At that time, a 
crowd of as many as 100,000 Protestant extremists had marched into 
London,25 overwhelming the city’s posse comitatus. Rioters burned 
houses throughout the city, thus forcing Parliament to adjourn.26 
Emboldened by their success in disrupting the government, the crowd 
stormed the city’s courts and prisons. They also set fire to the home 
of the great jurist, Lord Mansfield. The mob was finally dispelled by 
the army’s volley of musket fire, which was called upon by the 
King.27 With order restored, Parliament reconvened and debated the 
propriety of using military force to uphold the law. Lord Mansfield 
defended the crown’s actions by reminding the assembly of the posse 
comitatus. He stated, “I presume it is known to his Majesty’s 
confidential servants, that every individual, in his private capacity, 
may lawfully interfere to suppress a riot, much more to prevent acts 
of felony, treason, and rebellion.”28 He then continued by suggesting 
that the army’s actions in dispelling the mobs were the actions of a 
proper posse comitatus.29 He drew parallels to the jurata ad arma, 
where citizens played a role in both the military and in law 
enforcement.30  
What any single individual may lawfully do for the prevention 
of crime and preservation of the public peace, may be done by 
any number assembled to perform their duty as good citizens 
. . . The military have been called in . . . not as soldiers, but as 
citizens. No matter whether their coats be red or brown, they 
were employed, not to subvert, but to preserve, the laws and 
constitution which we all prize so highly.31  
 
 25. 7 CONG. REC. 3582 (1878). 
 26. Engdahl, Soldiers, supra note 11, at 31. 
 27. Id. at 32. 
 28. Id. at 33 (quoting THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY OF ENGLAND 688-98 (W. Cobbett 
ed. 1814)). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Engdahl, Soldiers, supra note 11, at 33-34 (quoting THE PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 
OF ENGLAND 688-98 (W. Cobbett, ed. 1914)). 
 https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol12/iss1/7
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Under the “Mansfield Doctrine,” uniformed soldiers serving in a 
posse perform their duty as citizen civilians to enforce the law, even 
though the military’s official use in the same situation would be 
impermissible.32  
As Britain expanded to the American colonies, its citizens brought 
with them their mistrust of the military, which they viewed as 
instruments of oppression and tyranny. According to Richard Kohn, 
“no principle of government was more widely understood or more 
completely accepted [by the founders] . . . than the danger of a 
standing army in peacetime.”33 The colonists, as British subjects, 
viewed themselves as inheritors of the same civil protections against 
military rule that citizens in England had gained following the 
Restoration, such as the Petition of Right.34 However, colonists 
initially had little exposure to military power. Only a limited number 
of British troops were present on the continent prior to 1763. In the 
absence of Indian threat, the colonists provided for their own 
collective defense by adopting the old English militia system.35 Much 
like those citizens serving in the jurata ad arma, every “able bodied 
male” in the Colonial militia was responsible for arming himself and 
participating in a local unit to serve in both a law enforcement and 
military reserve role.36 Colonists regarded the militia as 
fundamentally different from regular military forces, and thus was 
not subject to the same public suspicion or scrutiny.37  
As differences between the colonists and England grew, however, 
British military forces had to take on a much wider role. By 1763, 
London was working to tighten its control of the Colonies, and 
proposed moving as many as 10,000 troops to the Americas.38 This 
was the first time that the British government had stationed such a 
large number of redcoats in the Americas. Soon, British troops, rather 
 
 32. Id. at 35. 
 33. KOHN, supra note 7, at 2. 
 34. Engdahl, Military Intervention, supra note 14, at 3. See also Ex Parte Milligan, 71 
U.S. 2, 111 (1866). 
 35. KOHN, supra note 7, at 7. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Id. at 7-9. 
 38. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY, AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY, 
UNITED STATES ARMY 41 (Maurice Matloff ed., 1973) [hereinafter AMERICAN MILITARY 
HISTORY]. 
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than civil magistrates and the posse comitatus, were enforcing the 
law on a regular basis. Colonial antimilitary sentiment quickly began 
to mount in response.39  
According to one scholar, the “single most inflammatory” action 
to the colonists’ sensibilities was the British military’s actions that 
violated established principles of English law.40 Such actions 
included the involuntary quartering of troops and the enforcement of 
civil law by military force, both of which the Petition of Right41 and 
the Bill of Rights42 decried as illegal. The enactment of the 
Quartering Act of 1765 forcibly placed redcoats in private homes. 
This was an especially bitter insult to the colonists, as it was 
reminiscent of the tactics used by the Stuart and Tudor monarchs.43 
Samuel Adams was one of many colonists who protested these 
violations of established law: 
[L]et us then assert & maintain the honor—the dignity of free 
citizens and place the military . . . where they always ought & 
always will be plac’d in every free country, at the foot of the 
common law of the land. . . . to submit to the civil magistrate in 
the legal exercise of power is forever the part of a good subject 
. . . But, to be called to account by a common soldier, or any 
soldier, is a badge of slavery that none but a slave shall wear.44 
Nowhere was the increased military involvement in civil affairs 
more opposed than in Boston. Not only was the city a “hotbed of 
colonial discontent,” but the Massachusetts Bay Charter specifically 
forbade forced quartering of British troops in Bostonians’ private 
homes.45 The situation came to an ugly climax in March of 1770, 
when a formation of British soldiers opened fire upon a crowd of 
angry Bostonians who pelted them with rocks and snowballs. The 
attack killed five colonists, and wounded several others.46 The use of 
 
 39. Engdahl, Military Intervention, supra note 14, at 3-4. 
 40. Id. at 3. 
 41. Engdahl, Soldiers, supra note 11, at 43 (citing 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 733-47 (1789). 
 42. Engdahl, Military Intervention, supra note 14, at 6. 
 43. Id. at 7. 
 44. Samuel Adams, Address in Protest of the British Army in Boston (1768), reprinted in 
DOUGLAS, supra note 10, at 113-14 (emphasis in original). 
 45. Engdahl, Soldiers, supra note 11, at 24. 
 
 46. Id.  
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professional soldiers instead militia, without a civil proclamation 
ordering for British citizens to disperse, was in clear violation of the 
Riot Act of 1714.47 Building up to the onset of hostilities in 1775, this 
incident grew into a rallying cry for opposition against the Crown. 
Parliament attempted to control this mounting resistance by enacting 
the Administration of Justice Act in 1774.48 The Act acknowledged 
that the civil authorities and the posse comitatus were the proper 
means to disperse a mob, but also allowed for an unrestrained 
military force to restore order.49 
The colonists’ outrage over the “Boston Massacre” persisted for 
more than six years, until the Declaration of Independence in 1776. 
The Declaration decried the King’s use of military forces to: 
“compleat the works of death”50 against civilians; maintain “in times 
of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislature;”51 
“render the military independent of and superior to the Civil 
Powers;”52 and “quarter[] large bodies of armed troops among us.”53 
These abuses, the colonists concluded, were “totally unworthy . . . of 
a civilized nation.”54 One historian noted that [t]his repudiation of 
military intervention in domestic law enforcement,” which the 
founders viewed as an offense against civil liberties, became “the 
bedrock of due process on which the American government was 
built.”55  
With the end of the Revolutionary War, and a brief but 
unsuccessful dalliance with the Articles of Confederation, Americans 
took up the issue of the role of the military at the Constitutional 
Convention in 1789. According to historians such as David Engdahl, 
the most contentious issue at this assembly was whether there should 
be a national standing army.56 As the Supreme Court stated in 
Perpich v. Department of Defense, the delegates’ “widespread fear 
 
 47. Id. at 25. 
 48. Gates, supra note 21, at 1471. 
 49. Id. 
 50. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 27 (U.S. 1776). 
 51. Id. at para. 13. 
 52. Id. at para. 14. 
 53. Id. at para. 16. 
 54. Id. at para. 27. 
 55. Engdahl, Military Intervention, supra note 14, at 7. 
 56. Id. at 4. 
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that a national standing army posed an intolerable threat to individual 
liberty and the sovereignty of the separate States”57 deeply affected 
the Constitution’s drafting. The delegates were so deeply suspicious 
that seven of the thirteen colonies—Pennsylvania, North Carolina, 
Virginia, Delaware, Maryland, New Hampshire and Vermont—stated 
in their own constitutions that standing armies “are dangerous to 
liberty.”58 Most of the colonies also prohibited army officers from 
holding civilian public office.59 Maryland even excluded militia 
officers from these positions.60  
Although many delegates to the convention had concerns about a 
standing army, nearly every delegate recognized the need to provide 
for the effective defense of the nation.61 Because the nation strongly 
relied upon militia forces during the Revolutionary War, most 
delegates believed that public opposition to standing armies, the 
existence of militia, and America’s geographic separation from 
Europe made a standing army unnecessary.62 To others, the inability 
of state militia forces to quickly put down Shay’s Rebellion 
demonstrated that they were not adequately armed to uphold the 
common defense.63 General Charles Pinckney of South Carolina 
supported this latter argument, arguing to the South Carolina ratifying 
convention that “the dignity of a government could [not] be 
maintained, its safety insured, or its laws administered, without a 
body of regular forces to aid the magistrate in the execution of his 
duty.”64 Despite serious reservations, Federalists such as Alexander 
Hamilton also lobbied for the creation of a national army to respond 
to threats. “Few persons,” stated Hamilton, “will be so visionary as 
seriously to contend that military forces ought not to be raised to 
quell a rebellion or resist an invasion.”65  
After much debate, the Convention accepted the necessity of a 
 
 57. Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 340 (1990). See generally 7 CONG. REC. 3579 
(1878). 
 58. 7 CONG. REC. 3579 (1878). 
 59. Engdahl, Soldiers, supra note 11, at 29. 
 60. Id. 
 61. KOHN, supra note 7, at 75. 
 62. Id. at 80. 
 63. Id. at 78. 
 64. Id. at 76. 
 65. Engdahl, Soldiers, supra note 11, at 41. 
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federal military on the condition that there be safeguards established 
to keep the military under civilian control. The delegates from New 
York, Virginia, North Carolina, and Rhode Island wanted an explicit 
clause in the Constitution establishing the military’s subordinate to 
civil authorities,66 while North Carolina and Virginia demanded a 
limit on how long soldiers could serve in peacetime.67 
Representatives from New Hampshire, Virginia, New York, North 
Carolina, and Rhode Island clamored for constitutional protection 
against the quartering of soldiers. They also sought to require 
legislative approval for maintaining a standing army.68  
As with much in the Constitution, the final agreement was a 
“bundle of compromises.”69 It divided military control between the 
federal government and the states, giving the majority to the central 
government, but guarding against abuse by dividing that allotment 
between the executive and legislative branches. It allowed for a 
standing army and navy, but restricted military appropriations to two 
years, and additionally appointed a civilian commander-in-chief.70  
The founders’ “jealousy of the executive power”71 was most 
evident in their delegation of financial control—their most potent 
safeguard—to the legislature, rather than to the President. Although 
the Constitution’s final form did not include an explicit provision 
regarding the domestic use of military forces, the Bill of Rights 
incorporated many aspects of the delegates’ original proposals. In 
particular, Hamilton chose the Fifth Amendment’s due process clause 
to satisfy the delegates who demanded a clear separation between 
civil and military authority.72 The Amendment’s emphasis on the full 
and unhindered process of the law implies the superiority of the civil 
sphere over the exercise of military authority.  
As one scholar has observed, however, despite the Bill of Rights, 
“[d]uring the first ninety years of the republic, there was no clear 
 
 66. Id. at 42. 
 67. Id. at 41. 
 68. Id. at 41. 
 69. Paul Schott Stevens, U.S. ARMED FORCES AND HOMELAND DEFENSE: THE LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK 4 n.3 (Center for Strategic and International Studies Report, 2001). 
 70. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1, 12 & 13. 
 71. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 54 (1866). 
 72. Engdahl, Military Intervention, supra note 14, at 5. 
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constitutional or legal barrier to the use of federal troops to enforce 
the laws.”73 Part of this stemmed from the belief—as the Mansfield 
Doctrine suggests—that the posse comitatus is not only composed by 
the able-bodied populace, but also by the military.74 The Judiciary 
Act of 1789 supported this theory, allowing a federal marshal to 
“command all necessary assistance in the execution of his duty.”75 
Three years later, the law was amended in the Militia Act to allow the 
marshals to mobilize state militia to help enforce the law.76 The Act 
provided that the President could call forth the militia when “the laws 
of the United States shall be opposed or the execution thereof 
obstructed, in any state by combinations too powerful to be 
suppressed by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings or by the 
power invested in the marshals.”77 Like Lord Mansfield, the Act 
justified the involvement of troops under the pretense that they were 
acting as private citizens, not as soldiers. However, the Act’s 
distinction that the marshals could call only the militia, and not the 
regular military forces, became quickly lost in general practice.78 
B. The Civil War and Enactment of the PCA 
Despite the strong initial suspicion regarding domestic military 
involvement, a tradition of using the Army to subdue lawless areas 
quickly began to grow. Over the next eighty years, the federal 
marshals’ use of the Army as a means of legal enforcement became 
commonplace. This made the military an accepted part of the posse 
comitatus. The U.S. government first used military in this role to put 
down the 1792 Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania.79 By 1807, 
Congress felt confident enough in the Army—then small and 
 
 73. Edward F. Sherman, Contemporary Challenges to Traditional Limits on the Role of 
the Military in American Society, in MILITARY INTERVENTION IN DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES 216, 
219 (Peter J. Rowe & Christopher J. Whelan eds., 1985). 
 74. Gates, supra note 21, at 1469. 
 75. Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73, at § 27 (1789). 
 76. Militia Act of 1792., ch. 28, 1 Stat. 264 at § 2 (1792). 
 77. Id.  
 78. Maj. Clarence I. Meeks III, Illegal Law Enforcement: Aiding Civil Authorities in 
Violation of the Posse Comitatus Act, 70 MIL. L. REV. 83, 88 (1975). 
 
 79. Mackubin Thomas Owens, Soldiers Aren’t Cops, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (August 
1, 2002), at http://www.nationalreview.com/owens/owens080102.asp (last visited Feb. 17, 
2003). 
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dispersed along the frontier—to declare them to be an enforcer of 
federal law.80  
The first nationwide use of military force to enforce the law, 
however, happened over forty years later, under the Fugitive Slave 
Act of 1850. This law authorized federal marshals to call on the posse 
comitatus—composed of federal soldiers—to return a slave to his 
owner.81 In 1854, Attorney General Caleb Cushing issued an opinion 
defending the inclusion of whole military units in the posse 
comitatus, specifically citing the Mansfield doctrine. “The fact that 
they are organized as military bodies, under the immediate command 
of their own officers, does not in any wise affect their legal character. 
They are still the posse comitatus.”82 Six years later his successor, 
Jeremiah Black, hedged only slightly on this authority. Opining that 
uniformed soldiers could participate in a posse comitatus by acting in 
their capacity as citizens, Black conceded that “the military power 
must be kept in strict subordination to the civil authority, since it is 
only in the aid of the latter that the former can act at all.”83  
The Civil War and Reconstruction periods marked the apex of 
military law enforcement. During the war, Union troops in the North 
regularly overrode civilian officials to act against secessionists, 
detaining civilians suspected of being Confederate sympathizers. In 
the South, the Army directly supported the Reconstruction 
governments in the former Confederate states from 1866 to 1877.84 
When ten former Confederate states refused to ratify the Fourteenth 
Amendment in 1867, Congress passed the first Reconstruction Act,85 
establishing military rule in the South. The Act divided the region 
into five military districts, with each district commanded by a general 
who was authorized to use his forces to protect life and property.86 
President Grant interpreted the Act’s terms to authorize the Army to 
enforce “entire control over the civil governments.”87 The Army’s 
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 81. Sherman, supra note 73, at 219. 
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 85. Id. at 16. 
 86. ERIC FONER, A SHORT HISTORY OF RECONSTRUCTION: 1863-1877, 122 (1990). 
 87. ALLAN R. MILLET & PETER MASLOWSKI, FOR THE COMMON DEFENSE: A MILITARY 
 Washington University Open Scholarship
p 99 Canestaro book pages.doc  4/9/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
112 Journal of Law & Policy [Vol. 12:99 
 
enforcement powers included the removal and replacement of any 
resisting officials, as well as supervising voter registration and 
elections, managing court proceedings, and approving state 
constitutions.88 The military’s involvement was sweeping and 
commonplace.89 When marshals needed to forcibly enforce or restore 
the law, they inevitably called upon Union soldiers rather than 
members of the general population to serve as a posse.90 By 1878, the 
Army had performed its enforcement duties on hundreds of 
occasions,91 including tax collection, labor conflict suppression, and 
the interdiction of illicit liquor production.92 The 1871 Ku Klux Klan 
Act made the military’s enforcement of the law even more powerful. 
The Act gave federal troops nearly unrestrained power to intervene 
and restore order. Additionally, it granted the President with the 
requisite authority to uphold the law militarily without resorting to 
civil process. President Grant quickly employed this authority to 
declare a “condition of lawlessness” in much of South Carolina.93 He 
suspended habeas corpus in nine counties,94 and sent federal troops 
to make hundreds of arrests.95  
Military rule forcibly installed northern “carpetbaggers” and 
“scalawags” into southern political institutions. Military rule also 
removed thousands of local officials and six state governors from 
office, purged state legislatures, and used military dictum to modify 
state law.96 On at least three occasions, federal troops occupied the 
Louisiana state legislature and harassed its legislators.97 The 
“spectacle” of federal troops “marching into the hall and expelling 
members at the point of the bayonet,” incited outrage in both the 
North and the South alike, thus generating intense controversy in the 
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 90. Id. at 711. 
 91. AMERICAN MILITARY HISTORY, supra note 38, at 285. See also 7 CONG. REC. 3581 
(1878). 
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Democrat-controlled Congress.98 Even President Grant 
acknowledged that of the Reconstruction measures, “much of it, no 
doubt[,] was unconstitutional.”99 Yet he expressed his hope that the 
new reconstruction measures would “serve their purpose before the 
question of constitutionality could be submitted to the judiciary and a 
decision obtained.”100 
The situation came to a head over the results of the disputed 1876 
Presidential election. Republican Rutherford B. Hayes won the 
Presidency over his opponent, Democrat Samuel J. Tilden, by only 
the disputed electoral votes of three states, South Carolina, Louisiana, 
and Florida.101 Coincidentally, these were the same states where 
thousands of “special deputy marshals”—federal troops—had been 
called out to guard the polls and to “prevent fraud.”102 President 
Grant claimed that these soldiers did nothing more than “preserve 
peace and prevent intimidation of the voters.”103 On the same day that 
the election was awarded to Hayes, southern Democrats introduced a 
rider on an Army appropriations bill, providing that increased 
military funds could not be used in “support . . . of any state 
government or office thereof.”104 Although the clause was narrowly 
drafted, partisan debate over Congress’s ability to limit the 
executive’s authority to command the Army caused a stall in its 
conference committee.105  
Congress introduced a broader version at the beginning of its 
forty-fifth session, which proscribed the use of both land and naval 
forces.106 A compromise version that shortly followed gained wider 
support, however, by adding a punitive clause and limiting its scope 
to a single reference of the Army.107 On June 18, 1878, President 
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Hayes signed the PCA into law. In order to further mollify 
Republicans, the final version included a clause allowing 
Constitutionally- or Congressionally-authorized military 
enforcement.108  
C. The Drug War Amendments to the PCA 
The PCA’s most recent changes came out of President Reagan’s 
“war on drugs” during the 1980s. During the early part of that 
decade, drug smuggling into the United States was on the rise, and 
had increased from an estimated $45 billion in 1979 to as much as 
$80 billion in 1981.109 Civil authorities seemed unable to prevent this 
flood of drugs from crossing the borders. Some law enforcement 
estimates suggest that as much as eighty-five percent of illicit 
narcotics were entering the country unhampered.110 Law enforcement 
agencies were hamstrung by budgetary and personnel shortages. 
Therefore, the legislative search for a solution turned to the military, 
the only component of the government with both the personnel and 
the equipment to combat the problem on a national level. Nicholas 
Mavroules, the Chairman of the Investigations Subcommittee of the 
House Armed Services Committee, recognized that “charging the 
military with the mission of detecting and monitoring the aerial and 
maritime transit of drugs into the United States, . . . capitalizes on the 
tremendous manpower and technology of the Department of 
Defense.”111 
In both the 1981 and 1988 hearings, there was strong opposition 
for the prospect of military involvement in counter-drug efforts, most 
notably from the DoD. Many military commanders remained 
concerned that this new mission would detract from their readiness to 
fight the nation’s wars. In a hearing before Congress, Secretary of 
Defense Carlucci stated that “the Armed Forces should not become a 
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police force, nor can we afford to degrade readiness by diverting 
badly needed resources from their assigned missions.”112 Several 
other senior military officials, including the Vice Chair of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff, echoed his argument in their subsequent testimony.113  
In the end, however, Congress was most moved by the testimony 
of local and state governments and officials who pleaded for military 
assistance. Congress suspected that the DoD was opposied to the 
change only because it found counter-drug missions undesirable. It 
therefore voted to force military commanders to provide assistance to 
civil authorities, and moved to establish “clear legal principles 
regarding effective cooperation between the military and civilian law 
enforcement agencies.”114 The amendments to the PCA, codified in 
10 U.S.C. §§ 371-381, called for the DoD to provide indirect 
assistance to law enforcement.115 This support included intelligence, 
equipment, maintenance support,116 use of military facilities,117 
specialized training and tactical advice.118  
Military personnel could operate equipment in support of law 
enforcement if it related to: the “detection, monitoring, and 
communication of air and sea traffic;”119 aerial reconnaissance; and, 
most importantly, the interception of aircraft outside the United 
States “for the purpose[] of direct[ing them] . . . to a location 
designated by appropriate civilian officials.”120 However, Congress 
also defined strict limits for the permissible degree of military 
involvement, precluding servicemen from becoming involved in 
active measures such as “search and seizure, and arrest, or other 
similar activities.”121 In an attempt to mollify military hardliners, 
Congress conceded that the DoD could refuse a request for help if it 
would “adversely affect the military preparedness of the United 
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States,”122 while also requiring civilian authorities to reimburse the 
military for assistance provided.123 
Congress also directed the Secretary of Defense to draft 
regulations establishing military policy to reflect the newly revised 
PCA.124 The subsequent DoD directives echoed many provisions of 
the PCA, including a prohibition of active law enforcement. 
Additionally, it prohibited any other activity which would cause 
federal troops to become involved in the interdiction of land, sea, or 
air transportation without the authorization of civilian law 
enforcement.125 The regulations also provided that military personnel 
are not to be used for the “surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as 
undercover agents, informants, investigators, or interrogators.”126 
Notably, although the PCA did not expressly include the Navy and 
the Marine Corps as a matter of law, the DoD provided that the 
restrictions would apply to these services as a matter of policy.127  
III. EROSION OF POSSE COMITATUS: THE EXCEPTIONS 
The PCA contains an exception clause, providing that in 
“circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of 
Congress,”128 military forces may be used to enforce the law. 
Although this clause was primarily added to the text to insure the 
bill’s passage in the face of Republican opposition, it has since taken 
on a life of its own. Especially since the end of World War II, the 
dramatic growth of federal powers, and the extensive delegation of 
legislative authority to the President, has resulted in a series of 
significant exceptions to the clause. First, as the exact boundaries of 
unilateral executive power are not completely defined in the 
Constitution, the President may interpret the Constitution to allow the 
President to wield extensive emergency powers. Second, Congress 
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has passed numerous exceptions to the PCA in response to modern 
national security threats such as drugs, terrorism, and weapons of 
mass destruction. These include the 1981 and 1988 amendments, 
disaster response procedures, the enforcement of the Uniform Code 
of Military Justice, and, importantly, the legal authority for the 
President to respond forcibly to insurrection, rebellion, or civil 
unrest.129  
A. “Except in cases expressly Authorized by the Constitution or act  
of Congress . . .”; The Constitutional and Legislative Exceptions to 
the PCA 
The PCA specifically recognizes both constitutional and 
legislative exceptions. Of the two, the concept of a constitutional 
exception is more problematic. The Constitution does not specifically 
prohibit using the military to enforce the law. Furthermore, the 
congressional record indicates that the PCA’s wording was a 
compromise intended to secure Congress’s approval, rather than a 
reference to some explicit form of authority.130 Analysis of this clause 
suggests that the Presidential emergency powers might fall within 
this clause, but the boundaries of executive power remain “relatively 
unexplored.”131 Though Congress legislated presidential authority to 
respond to insurrections and invasions with military force, the 
amount of unilateral that authority the President has to enforce the 
law outside remains substantially undefined.  
In support of emergency powers, scholars point to the founder’s 
apparent intention to create an “energetic executive” in the 
Presidency.132 In support of this view, scholars posit that it is 
“essential to the protection of the community against foreign attacks 
. . . [and] the steady administration of the laws,”133 and crucial to the 
nation as “the bulwark of national security.”134 They do, however, 
harbor deep suspicions about the dangers of centralized authority and 
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a standing army, and thus grant the military’s most crucial safeguards 
to the legislature. As such, the extent of the President’s emergency 
military powers may only occupy the “zone of twilight” where the 
President may act if Congress has not.135  
Proponents of executive authority still attest that sufficient support 
exists within the Constitution to imply that the President has 
extensive emergency powers. They generally rely on Articles III and 
IV, 136 but draw the broadest authority from Article II’s charge that 
the President should “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed.”137 Secondary sources, such as the writings of Alexander 
Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay, also offer general support to 
this theory, arguing that broad executive powers are essential to the 
defense of liberty: 
[I]t is impossible to foresee or define the extent and variety of 
national exigencies, and the correspondant extent and variety 
of the means which may be necessary to satisfy them. The 
circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite; 
and for this reason, no constitutional shackles can wisely be 
imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.138  
A limited amount of case law supports this theory, suggesting that 
the President has an implied duty to enforce both the law and the 
“law of the land” by military force, if necessary.139 The latter contains 
treaties and obligations implied by the Constitution, and 
responsibilities derived from presidential duties.140 In re Debs141 also 
suggests that the President has military means at his disposal to 
enforce the law. “If the emergency arises, the army of the nation, and 
all of its militia, are at the service of the nation to compel obedience 
to its laws.”142 Other secondary sources such as DoD regulations and 
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supporting opinions by the Department of Justice also refer to the 
government’s “inherent right . . . to ensure the preservation of public 
order and to carry out governmental operations . . . by force, if 
necessary.”143  
There is also the question of the constitutional validity of 
legislative limitations, such as the PCA, on the President’s authority 
to command the military. In 1957, Attorney General Herbert 
Brownell, Jr., advised President Eisenhower that the PCA does not 
make the President “impotent” to respond to a domestic crisis.144 
Brownell argued, in reference to enforcing school desegregation in 
the South, that “there are in any event grave doubts as to the authority 
of the Congress to limit the constitutional powers of the President to 
enforce the laws and preserve the peace under circumstances which 
he deems appropriate . . . a power essential to protection against 
pressing dangers . . . may well be deemed inherent in the executive 
office.”145 Brownell thus suggested that Congress may not legislate 
away the executive’s authority to use troops as needed.  
Opponents counter that the President does not hold any inherent 
emergency authority, as the Constitution makes no mention of a 
power to use the military to enforce the law. Instead, only Congress is 
authorized to “call forth the militia to execute the laws of the 
Union.”146 The findings expressed in Ex Parte Milligan,147 and the 
concurring opinions in Duncan v. Kahanamoku,148 both rejected the 
assertion that Presidential command of the military is beyond 
restriction. They held that although there “resides in the executive 
branch . . . [the power] to preserve order and insure the public safety 
in times of emergency,” 149 it does “not extend beyond what is 
required by the exigency that calls it forth.”150 It is “of a most 
temporary character,”151 and subject to judicial review. Furthermore, 
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the congressional record indicates that the drafters of the PCA 
intended its prohibitions to apply to everyone who successfully 
ordered the Army to execute the laws, “from the Commander-in-
Chief down to the lowest officer in the Army who may presume to 
take upon himself to decide when he shall use the military force in 
violation of the law of the land.”152  
As Justice Jackson indicated in Youngstown, where Congress has 
acted, presidential authority is at its maximum.153 Congress has 
granted explicit authority to the President to employ military force to 
enforce the law in a limited number of circumstances, which 
comprise the legislative exceptions to posse comitatus. Of these laws, 
the Insurrection Statutes provide the President with the most 
substantial powers to enforce the law. The first, now codified as 10 
U.S.C. § 331, originates from the Whiskey rebellion of 1792.154 It 
provides that in the case of “an insurrection in any State against its 
government,”155 the President may use the militia to suppress it. Its 
companion section, 10 U.S.C. § 332, gives the President substantial 
discretion to use the military in a variety of other domestic 
disturbances: 
Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions, 
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the 
authority of the United States make it impracticable to enforce 
the laws . . . by the ordinary course of judicial proceedings, he 
may call into Federal service such of the militia of any State, 
and use such of the armed forces, as he considers necessary to 
enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.156 
The President’s insurrection powers reach their apex under 10 
U.S.C. § 333, which states: 
The President, by using the militia or the armed forces . . . 
shall take such measures as he considers necessary to suppress, 
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in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful 
combination, or conspiracy if it— 
(1) So hinders the execution of the laws of that state, and of the 
United States . . . that any part or class of its people is deprived 
of a right, privilege, immunity, or protection named in the 
Constitution and secured by law . . . [or] 
(2) Opposes or obstructs the execution of the laws . . . or 
impedes the course of justice under those laws.157  
The reach of Section 333 is tremendous, as it broadly states that 
“mere frustration” is enough to trigger the President’s authority to 
employ military force.158 This is an exceedingly low threshold. 
Additionally, listing the deprivation of a “right” as a justifying factor 
accords the President with considerable discretion to militarily 
intervene in any situation where a civil liberty might be threatened. 
A series of other statutory authorizations allow the President or 
the military to act in a limited number of circumstances. Congress has 
authorized the military to enforce the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice,159 which allows the military to apprehend any soldier who 
has committed a criminal offense if it “reflects discredit upon the 
service.”160 Additionally, statutes provide that: the military may 
directly intervene to support territorial governors;161 the Secret 
Service may investigate crimes against the President, members of 
Congress, or other dignitaries;162 remove unauthorized persons from 
Indian lands;163 preserve national parks;164 and to enforce customs 
and quarantine laws.165 The Stafford Act166 also allows the President 
to provide federal troops to state governors for disaster relief 
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operations. The President has frequently relied on this authority in 
cases of national emergency, exercising it in response to both natural 
and man-made disasters. The Army assisted with relief efforts in the 
wake of Hurricane Hugo in the early 1990s,167 and helped control the 
riots in Los Angeles that followed in the wake of the Rodney King 
verdict.168  
The 1981 amendments to the PCA also directed the Secretary of 
Defense to issue regulations to implement the PCA.169 Department of 
Defense directives assert military authority to either enforce the law 
or provide assistance in emergency circumstances. Under this 
“immediate response authority,” the military may act to enforce the 
law or to provide other needed assistance in crisis situations without 
specific orders from the national command authority. The directive 
authorizes: 
[P]rompt and vigorous Federal action, including use of military 
forces, to prevent loss of life or wanton destruction of property 
and to restore governmental functioning and public order when 
sudden and unexpected civil disturbances, disaster, or 
calamities seriously endanger life and property and disrupt 
normal governmental functions to such an extent that duly 
constituted local authorities are unable to control the 
situation.170  
The emergency, however, must be either temporary, or entail a 
situation where the local authorities cannot or will not give sufficient 
protection.171 This doctrine can be used to justify military assistance 
in the wake of the San Francisco fire and earthquake in 1906,172 and 
 
 167. See JANET A. MCDONNELL, PUB. NO. EP 870-1-44, RESPONSE TO THE LOMA PRIETA 
EARTHQUAKE, v-vi (1993), at http://www.usace.army.mil/publications/eng-pamphlets/ep870-1-
44 (last visited Feb. 17, 2003). 
 168. See Los Angeles Riot Still Echoes a Decade Later, CNN.com, Apr. 29, 2002 (on file 
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in the capture of President McKinley’s assassin in 1901.173 In recent 
years, the military provided unsolicited emergency assistance in the 
form of “medevac ambulances, bomb detection dog teams, and 
various military personnel” after the bombing of the Murrah Federal 
building in Oklahoma City.174 
B. “Any part of the Army”: The Branch and Status of Service 
Exceptions to the PCA 
The PCA’s “any part of the Army” clause has given rise to a 
number of exceptions as to which forces are covered by the PCA. 
The first draft, a rider on an Army appropriations bill, mentioned 
only the Army as being subject. Modern versions have also included 
the Air Force.175 Although one of the PCA’s draft proposals formerly 
included “all ground and naval forces,” the Navy and the U.S. Marine 
Corps are not specifically mentioned in the current version.176 The 
historical record suggests the naval clause was likely cut from the 
PCA because of its inappropriateness on an Army appropriations bill, 
and also as a means to narrow its focus in order to assure its passage. 
A DoD regulation drafted in the wake of the 1981 Amendments to 
the PCA, however, indicated that it reserves the right to make case-
by-case exceptions to this policy with the Secretary of Defense’s 
approval.177 Thus, this reservation raises the possibility that personnel 
from these services could still be used for law enforcement.  
 
 173. Id. at 105 n.122 (citing NEW YORK TIMES, Sept. 7, 1901, at 1). 
 174. Maj. Kirk L. Davies, The Imposition of Martial Law in the United States, 49 A.F. L. 
REV. 67, 83 (2000). 
 175. The Air Force’s inclusion is partly due to its origins in the Army as the U.S. Army Air 
Corps and its deliberate addition to the bill when Congress incorporated the PCA into Title 18 
in 1956. Furman, supra note 9, at 96 n.70.  
 176. Some scholars have also pointed out the general inapplicability of the PCA to a naval 
force. They note that navies operate almost exclusively beyond their country’s borders. In 
addition, customary international law generally acknowledges navies as the enforcers of 
national law on the high seas. See Christopher A. Abel, Not Fit for Sea Duty: The Posse 
Comitatus Act, the United States Navy, and Federal Law Enforcement at Sea, 31 WM. AND 
MARY L. REV. 445, 457-60 (1990). 
 177. SECNAVINST, supra note 127, at 4. See also DODD 5525.5, supra note 125, at 
§ E4.3. 
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A limited number of cases have addressed possible posse 
comitatus violations by Navy or Marine Corps personnel.178 In United 
States v. Walden, Marines acting as undercover agents contributed to 
a civilian investigation of the illegal sale of firearms. The defense 
argued that the Marines violated military regulations as well as the 
PCA in their capacity as witnesses. They moved to apply the 
exclusionary rule against the evidence. The Fourth Circuit court 
affirmed the conviction, holding that the Marines’ actions violated 
Navy regulations, but not the PCA.179 The Ninth Circuit, in United 
States v. Roberts, also declined to extend the PCA to the Navy in the 
face of “plain language,” as its prohibitions only apply to the Army 
and Air Force.180 
The status of the service member—active duty, reserve, or 
National Guard—is as important as the branch of military service in 
determining whether the PCA is applicable. The PCA has been held 
to apply only to those soldiers in federal service under Title 10.181 
Hence, the Army National Guard or Reserve in Title 32 state 
service,182 or the United States Coast Guard under Title 14,183 are not 
considered within “any part of the Army” for purposes of the PCA.  
 
 178. See United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1974); United States v. Roberts 
779 F.2d 565 (9th Cir. 1986); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir. 1988). See also 
United States v. Rasheed, 802 F.Supp. 312, 324 (D. Haw. 1992); United States v. Mendoza-
Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1477-78 (11th Cir. 1992). 
 179. Walden, 490 F.2d at 376. 
 180. Roberts, 779 F.2d at 567. 
 181. Gilbert v. United States, 165 F.3d 470, 473 (6th Cir. 1999). See also Perpich v. Dep’t 
of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 345-46 (1990). 
 182. DODD, supra note 125, at § E4.2. 
 
 183. The Coast Guard is a hybrid agency, organized under both Title 14 and the 
Department of Transportation. Its charter gives it a specific law enforcement mission—to 
“enforce or assist in the enforcement of all applicable federal laws on and under the high seas 
and waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States.” See 14 U.S.C. § 2 (1994). The Coast 
Guard is also, however, “a military service and a branch of the Armed Forces,” operating in the 
service of the Navy. See 14 U.S.C. §§ 1, 3 (1977); 14 U.S.C.A. § 3 (1977). A variety of courts 
have held that the PCA does not apply to the Coast Guard. See Jackson v. State, 572 P.2d 87, 93 
(Alaska 1977). See also United States v. Chaparo-Almeida, 679 F.2d 423, 425 (5th Cir. 1982); 
Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d at 1477-78. Additionally, it is questionable whether the “any part of 
the army” clause in the PCA covers civilian DoD employees. Current DoD regulations exclude 
such personnel, even if they are investigators working under a military officer to enforce 
civilian law. See DODD, supra note 125, at § E4.2.3. But see United States v. Chon, 210 F.3d 
990, 993 (9th Cir. 2000), where members of the Naval Criminal Investigative Service were 
found to be within the PCA as they were part of the “strength and authority” of the military, 
even as private individuals within that institution. 
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As a result, an analysis of the status of the soldier is determinative 
to the applicability of the PCA. This is complicated, however, due to 
the National Guard’s construction as a hybrid organization with both 
federal and state aspects. Guardsmen simultaneously hold 
membership in both the National Guard of each state, and the 
National Guard of the United States.184 The federal military trains, 
equips, and funds state National Guardsmen, but the Guardsmen 
remain outside the boundaries of the national military until they are 
placed into federal service.185 Separating federalized National Guard 
from state controlled guardsmen is based entirely on whether the 
President or the Governor maintains command and control—not 
whether state or federal money funds operations.186 As explained by 
the D.C. District Court in United States v. Dern:187 
[E]xcept when employed in the service of the United States, 
officers of the National Guard continue to be officers of the 
state and not officers of the United States or of the Military 
Establishment of the United States. . . . The United States may 
organize, may arm, and may discipline, but all of this is in 
contemplation of, and preparation for, the time when the 
militia may be called into the national service. Until that event, 
the government of the militia is committed to the states.188 
When the guard operates as a state militia, the state Governor 
retains command. The Governor may employ the guard in “civilian 
support missions,” without consulting the DoD.189 When the guard is 
 
 184. Lt. Col. Steven B. Rich, The National Guard, Drug Interdiction and Counterdrug 
Activities, and Posse Comitatus: The Meaning and Implications of ‘In Federal Service,’ 1994-
JUN. ARMY LAW. 35, 37-38 (1994). See also Perpich, 496 U.S. at 345. 
 185. United States v. Dern, 74 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1934). 
 186. Rich, supra note 184, at 40. 
 187. Dern, 74 F.2d 485. 
 188. Id. at 487. 
 189. Kurt Andrew Schlichter, Locked and Loaded: Taking Aim at the Growing Use of the 
American Military in Civilian Law Enforcement Operations, 26 LOY. L.A. REV. 1291, 1307 
(1993). Additionally, National Guard Units may undertake counter-drug missions so long as 
they remain in state service. Guard units doing drug sweeps receive federal funds so long as 
they are state-controlled. See 32 U.S.C. § 112(a)(1) (2000). The advantage of this approach is 
that the Guard PCA remaining in state authority will circumvent the in state authority, thus 
allowing them to undertake federally-funded active law enforcement measures which would be 
prohibited if they were under actual federal control. See also United States v. Hutchings, 127 
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federalized, the President assumes command, and the PCA applies.  
It is also important to note that the PCA applies only to on-duty 
servicemen. It does not apply to off-duty forces acting, as Lord 
Mansfield would have suggested, in their private capacity as 
citizens.190 Such “private service” could include reporting crimes, 
suspicious activity, or making citizen’s arrests while off-post.191 In 
any circumstance, the soldier must not be compelled by order to serve 
as a “volunteer.” He has to be acting purely in a personal capacity.192 
Aid given “under the control or direction,” or circumstances equating 
to operating with the knowledge and acquiescence of a superior, 
would likely constitute as official military action.193  
C. “To Execute the Laws”: The Level of Assistance Exceptions 
Another exception to the PCA is the level of military involvement 
that is needed to constitute an “execution” of the law as defined by 
the PCA. Contradictory holdings in a series of cases arising out of the 
1973 Wounded Knee standoff—United States v. Jamarillo,194 United 
States v. Red Feather,195 and United States v. McArthur196—prompted 
Congress to amend the PCA in 1981. This dramatically widened the 
scope of permissible military involvement.  
On February 27, 1973, radical members of the American Indian 
Movement stormed the village of Wounded Knee on the Pine Ridge 
Indian reservation in South Dakota. The band occupied the town, 
looted stores, and broke into its post office.197 They then took 
hostages and established an armed perimeter around the area. 
Officers from the FBI, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the U.S. 
Marshals surrounded the site, sealing it off with a series of 
roadblocks. Both sides remained in place for the next seventy-one 
 
F.3d 1255 (10th Cir. 1997); United States v. Benish, 5 F.3d 20 (3rd Cir. 1993). 
 190. DODD, supra note 125, at §E4.2.4. 
 191. Meeks, supra note 78, at 126 n.242. 
 192. Meeks, supra note 78, at 126. 
 193. Id. at 127. See also DODD, supra note 125, at §E4.2.4. 
 194. United States v. Jamarillo, 380 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Neb. 1974). 
 195. United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916 (D.S.D. 1975). 
 196. United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186 (D.N.D. 1975). 
 197. Jamarillo, 380 F.Supp. at 1377. 
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days, exchanging periodic gunfire.198 
Four days after the standoff began, Colonel Volney Warner, Chief 
of Staff for the U.S. Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, and Colonel 
Jack Potter, the Sixth Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, 
were ordered to the site to determine if military assistance would be 
required.199 The colonels evaluated the situation and advised against 
military involvement, but they remained at the scene to provide their 
advice and counsel.200 They authorized the transfer of armored 
personnel carriers from the South Dakota National Guard to the 
control of law enforcement officers at the scene, and provided for 
Guardsman mechanics to maintain them.201 The colonels also 
requisitioned considerable stores of military equipment, including 
sniper rifles, ammunition, and flares for the FBI’s use, and ordered 
aerial surveillance of the site by military aircraft.202 
The Defendants in Red Feather, McArthur, and Jamarillo were 
captured while trying to break through the roadblocks that prevented 
entry to Wounded Knee. They were charged with a violation of 18 
USC § 231(a)(3), prohibiting the obstruction of peace officers 
“lawfully engaged in the lawful performance of [their] official 
duties.”203 Seeking to prove that the government agents were not 
“lawfully engaged,” the defense sought to introduce evidence of the 
military’s involvement in the standoff, and argued that the PCA made 
such military involvement improper.204 In response, the government 
filed a motion in limine to restrict the introduction of evidence of 
military support.205 
In the leading Wounded Knee case, United States v. Red Feather, 
the district court interpreted the PCA’s “uses any part of the Army or 
the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise” to mean only “direct 
active use”206 in executing the law. Such active support includes 
 
 198. Id. 
 199. Id. at 1379. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. at 1379-1380. 
 202. Id.  
 203. Id. at 1376. 
 204. Id. at 1375. 
 205. United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 918 (D.S.D. 1975). 
 206. Id. at 922. 
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“arrest, seizure of evidence, search of a person, . . . investigation of 
crime, interviewing witnesses, pursuit of an escaped civilian prisoner, 
. . . and other like activities.”207 The holding in Red Feather stands 
for the proposition that providing material and equipment from the 
military to law enforcement is merely passive assistance, and 
therefore the PCA does not prohibit it. 
The outcome in United States v. Jamarillo differed significantly 
from Red Feather. As a test of improper military involvement, the 
Jamarillo court sought to determine whether the military’s assistance 
“pervaded the activities” of civilian authorities.208 The Jamarillo 
court ruled that the military’s provision of supplies and equipment 
was not a de jure violation. Nevertheless, it ultimately held that the 
military advisors’ influence on the FBI’s negotiations, the use of 
equipment, and the policy regarding the use of force, raised sufficient 
doubt as to whether the civilian officers were “lawfully engaged” in 
the performance of their duty.209 Thus, the court dismissed the 
indictment because the government failed to meet its burden of 
proof.210 
The third case, United States v. McArthur, affirmed by the Eighth 
Circuit in United States v. Casper,211 crafted a different standard for 
determining whether the military’s involvement exceeded the PCA’s 
boundaries. The district court asked whether “military personnel 
subjected . . . citizens to the exercise of military power which was 
regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature.”212 Applying this 
test, it found no PCA violation, ruling that Colonel Warner’s 
influence on the Wounded Knee standoff was primarily a result of his 
expertise.213 Likening the lending of advisors to the lending of 
military equipment, the court analogized that “to my mind, Colonel 
Warner was borrowed as a vehicle might be borrowed.”214 The 
associated Wounded Knee case, United States v. Yunis, clarified the 
 
 207. Id. at 925. 
 208. Jamarillo, 380 F. Supp. at 1379. 
 209. Id. at 1378. 
 210. Id. at 1381. 
 211. United States v. Casper, 541 F.2d 1275 (8th Cir. 1976). 
 212. United States v. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. 186, 194 (D.N.D. 1975). 
 213. Id. at 194-95. 
 214. McArthur, 419 F. Supp. at 195. 
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factors of the McArthur test.215 In Yunis, the district court relied on 
McArthur’s “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory” standard, 
holding that “a power regulatory . . . controls or directs, . . . a power 
proscriptive in nature . . . prohibits or condemns, . . . and a power 
compulsory in nature exerts some coercive force.”216  
The contradictory decisions in Red Feather, Jamarillo, and 
McArthur threw the understanding of the PCA into disarray. 
Specifically, issues arose among both the military and civil 
authorities as to what comprised an actual violation of the PCA and 
to what degree the military can assist civil authorities. Although the 
government successfully defeated in the posse comitatus defense in 
both Red Feather and McArthur, the substantial differences in the 
three decisions cast doubt onto the boundaries of PCA violations.  
The 1981 amendments to the PCA were intended to resolve much 
of this confusion. To pave the way for a DoD role in the “war on 
drugs,” Congress established clear legislative guidance on what sort 
of assistance was permissible. Congress adopted Red Feather’s 
“active versus passive” standard, allowing the government 
considerable freedom to provide military assistance to local 
authorities.217 By defining the prohibited “active” measures, such as 
search, seizure, and arrest, the first three sections of the 1981 
amendments clearly favored the Red Feather holding. These 
provisions allowed the DoD to provide many of the same sorts of 
passive aid that had been challenged in the Wounded Knee cases: 
providing equipment, supplies, technical assistance, intelligence, and 
training.  
The DOD’s directives, issued subsequent to the PCA’s 
amendments, were also in line with the Wounded Knee decisions. 
These decisions adopted the McArthur test as a supplemental 
standard for determining an improper level of military assistance. By 
establishing that the Navy or Marine Corps are potentially exempt 
from the PCA, the directives require the Secretary of Defense’s 
approval before either service engages in the “interdiction of a vessel 
or aircraft, a law enforcement search or seizure, an arrest, 
 
 215. United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 891 (D.C. Cir. 1988). 
 216. Id. at 895-96. 
 217. United States v. Red Feather, 392 F. Supp. 916, 924-25 (D.S.D. 1975). 
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apprehension, or other activity that is likely to subject civilians to the 
use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive or 
compulsory.”218 
D. Pushing the Boundaries of the PCA: Defining PCA Violations and 
Applying an Exclusionary Rule 
Over the years, defense attorneys have pressed courts to 
strengthen the PCA by adopting an exclusionary rule for evidence 
obtained by military personnel who are acting in violation of its 
terms. The courts have been very reluctant to broaden the powers of 
the PCA beyond its strict interpretation as a criminal statute. Relying 
heavily on a narrow view of both the statutory language and the 
legislative record, the courts have almost unanimously avoided the 
question by not finding a PCA violation. More interestingly, they 
have also refused to enforce an exclusionary rule, even in the face of 
clear violations. The judiciary’s resistance to broadening the PCA’s 
protections is significant, because it demonstrates the courts’ 
continuing deference to military activity and unwillingness to 
counterbalance the increasing exceptions to the PCA with substantial 
evidentiary power. 
Historically, many PCA-related cases arose from the “best of 
intentions.” These include the base commanders’ efforts to help their 
civilian counterparts in criminal investigations or in military asset 
loans to pursue and capture escaped convicts.219 One scholar 
describes the historical trend as the military’s “understandable 
temptation to help the local authorities, born of morality and the 
desire for good public relations.”220 The author notes that such 
“temptation may lead to subterfuge,”221 when military personnel who 
are eager to help invent excuses to intervene in violation of beyond 
the PCA mandates.  
In the 1981 PCA amendments, Congress explicitly encouraged the 
military to perform training exercises for assisting law enforcement, 
 
 218. DODD, supra note 125, at § E4.3.2. 
 219. Meeks, supra note 78, at 110. 
 220. Furman, supra note 9, at 118. 
 221. Id. at 118. 
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but only as “an incidental aspect of training performed for a military 
purpose.”222 For example, the congressional record suggests that “the 
scheduling of routine training missions can easily accommodate the 
need for improved intelligence information covering drug trafficking 
in the Caribbean.”223 This instruction provides a considerable 
opportunity for the military to circumvent the PCA. In effect, holding 
riot control training in an area beset by civil disorder,224 or 
conducting infantry field exercises in a forest where a convict is on 
the run,225 stretches the PCA to its breaking point. Major Furman 
condemns such trickery “as violative of both the letter and the spirit 
of the law.”226 Department of the Navy regulations sternly warn that 
ostensibly military-directed activities should not be used as a 
“subterfuge” to provide covert assistance.227  
As a result of these ambiguities, judicial analysis of military 
assistance to civilians has often turned on either the military purpose 
doctrine or the degree of military personnel involvement. Under the 
military purpose doctrine, military action that enforces civil law is 
legitimate when its primary purpose will either further a military 
function or enforce the Uniform Code of Military Justice, “regardless 
of the incidental benefits to civilian authorities.”228 This includes 
military law enforcement cases where there is reasonable ground to 
believe that a crime is related to military personnel, or when a 
civilian commits a crime that affects a military installation.229  
A series of cases have upheld the validity of military 
investigations on the basis of the military purpose doctrine.230 In 
 
 222. Col. Paul Jackson Rice, New Laws and Insights Encircle the Posse Comitatus Act, 104 
MIL. L. REV. 109, 114 (1984) (quoting DODD 5525.5, Encl. 2, para. A.5 (Mar. 22, 1982)). 
 223. Id. at 114 (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 87-71, at 8). 
 224. Id. at 121. 
 225. Furman, supra note 9, at 118-19. 
 226. Id. at 119. 
 227. SECNAVINST, supra note 127, at 4. 
 228. DODD, supra note 125, at § E4.1.2.1. See also Furman, supra note 9, at 112-26; Rice, 
supra note 222, at 128; Meeks, supra note 78, at 124-26. 
 229. Jonathan W. Hitesman, Fighting in Another Direction: The Posse Comitatus Act and 
the War on Drugs in Hawai’i Under State v. Pattioay, 18 U. HAW. L. REV 835, 843 (1996). 
 230. See United States v. Hartley, 486 F. Supp 1348 (D. Fla. 1980); United States v. Bacon, 
851 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1988); United States v. Hartley, 796 F.2d 112 (5th Cir. 1986). See also 
United States v. Chon, 210 F.3d 990 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Thompson, 33 M.J. 218, 
221 (C.M.A. 1991); United States v. Hitchcock, 286 F.3d 1064 (9th Cir. 2002); Applewhite v. 
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United States v. Hartley, the defendants were under contract to sell 
shrimp to the DoD.231 A military investigation revealed that the 
defendants tampered with samples of their products in order to 
conceal the fact that their goods were substandard. The defendants 
claimed that the indictment should be dismissed because the Air 
Force investigators were operating in violation of the PCA.232 The 
court denied the defendants’ motion, holding that the investigation 
“involved military personnel . . . performing functions they would 
normally perform in the course of their duties.”233  
The Eleventh Circuit used a similar line of reasoning in United 
States v. Bacon.234 In Bacon, the military’s investigative service, the 
Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”), and the Georgia Bureau of 
Investigation, conducted a joint investigation that culminated when 
an undercover military investigator made a covert purchase from the 
defendant. Considering the military’s level of involvement in the 
investigation, the Bacon court ruled that there was no violation of the 
PCA.235 The military investigator assisted his civilian counterparts 
“only to the extent of activities normally performed in the ordinary 
course of his duties,”236 with no evident “military permeation of 
civilian law enforcement.”237  
In finding PCA violations, the courts also considered the breadth 
of participation by military personnel in their law enforcement 
duties.238 Under this standard, a violation during the military’s 
investigation is potentially indicated by the arrest of civilians, 
soldiers drawing their weapons in the course of their investigation, 
and the search, seizure, or administrative handling of suspects and 
evidence during arrest.239 In United States v. Yunis,240 the defendant, a 
 
United States Air Force, 995 F.2d 997 (10th Cir. 1993). 
 231. United States v. Hartley, 486 F. Supp. 1348 (1980). 
 232. Hartley, 486 F. Supp. at 1357. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Bacon, 851 F.2d 1312. 
 235. Id. 
 236. Bacon, 851 F.2d at 1313-14. 
 237. Id. at 1314. 
 238. See North Carolina v. Trueblood, 265 S.E.2d 662 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); see also 
United States v. al-Talib, 55 F.3d 923, 930 (4th Cir. 1995); Burns v. Texas, 473 S.W.2d 19 
(Tex. Crim. App. 1971). 
 239. Hitesman, supra note 229, at 857. 
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Lebanese hijacker, argued that the FBI committed a posse comitatus 
violation after it captured him overseas and transferred him to Navy 
custody for transport back to the United States. The court dismissed 
his argument, rehashing the Wounded Knee decisions to find that the 
Navy may only provide indirect assistance when it does not constitute 
“the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory power.”241 
Further, the court held that such action does not “amount to direct 
active involvement in the execution of the laws,”242 or “pervade the 
activities of civilian authorities.”243 In North Carolina v. Trueblood, 
the state court of appeals found no PCA violation where an Army 
criminal investigations officer rode as a passenger in a police car, 
wore no uniform, carried no weapon, and merely provided the police 
officer with the name and address of the suspect, an officer in the 
Army.244  
Even when the courts have found a violation of the PCA, they 
have still been surprisingly reluctant to enforce an exclusionary rule. 
The PCA does not provide that evidence gathered in violation of its 
terms is inadmissible. However, the congressional record indicates 
that the PCA was intended solely as a punitive measure against 
soldiers or civilians who would use the military to enforce a political 
agenda. The leading precedent in this line of cases, United States v. 
Walden,245 noted that “[the PCA] expresses a policy that is for the 
benefit of the people as a whole, but not one that may be fairly 
characterized as expressly designed to protect the personal rights” of 
individual citizens.246 Similarly, in State v. Pattioay,247 the Hawaiian 
Supreme Court ruled that the PCA is not “analogous” to 
constitutional rights. The court stated that the evidence must be 
suppressed when such rights are violated, as the PCA creates no such 
freedom for military investigations.248 
 
Khan, 35 F.3d 426 (9th Cir. 1994). 
 241. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1094. 
 242. Id. at 1094. 
 243. Id. at 1094. 
 244. Trueblood, 46 N.C. App. at 543. 
 245. United States v. Walden, 490 F.2d 372 (4th Cir. 1974). 
 246. Id. at 377 n.11. 
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 248. Id. at 922. 
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In Walden, the Fourth Circuit opted not to impose the 
“extraordinary remedy”249 of an exclusionary rule. Relying on both 
the relative obscurity of the rule and the limited number of reported 
violations, the court concluded that “[s]hould there be evidence of 
widespread or repeated violations . . . we will . . . consider whether 
adoption of an exclusionary rule is required as a future deterrent.”250 
Most courts have followed Walden’s lead.251 In United States v. 
Wolffs,252 the Fifth Circuit deferred from resolving the case on PCA 
grounds. Instead, the court held that even if the involvement of a CID 
investigator who is acting as an informant for local law enforcement 
would violate the PCA, it would still refrain from applying the 
exclusionary rule. The court stated unequivocally that only if they 
were “confronted in the future with widespread and repeated 
violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, . . . [would] . . . an 
exclusionary rule . . . be fashioned at that time.”253 The court in 
United States v. Roberts254 came to a similar holding, observing that 
the courts have “uniformly refused to apply the exclusionary rule to 
evidence seized in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.”255 In United 
States v. Cotton,256 the Ninth Circuit denied the application of the 
exclusionary rule by simply stating that “the remedy requested 
exceeds that required by the conduct.”257  
IV. HOMELAND DEFENSE: ENDS JUSTIFYING MEANS 
Homeland defense and domestic security was not a priority for the 
U.S. military before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Many 
senior officials in the intelligence community and the Bush and 
Clinton Administrations had been warning the military for several 
 
 249. Walden, 490 F.2d at 373. 
 250. Id. at 377. 
 251. Hitesman, supra note 229, at 858 n.162. See United States v. Roberts, 779 F.2d 565, 
568 (9th Cir. 1986). See also United States v. Mendoza-Cecelia, 963 F.2d 1467, 1478 (11th Cir. 
1992); United States v. Rasheed, 802 F. Supp. 312, 324 (D. Haw. 1992); State v. Danko, 219 
Kan. 490, 497-498 (Kan. 1976); United States v. Bacon, 851 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1988). 
 252. United States v. Wolffs, 594 F.2d 77 (5th Cir. 1979). 
 253. Id. at 85. 
 254. Roberts, 779 F.2d at 565. 
 255. Id. at 568. 
 256. United States v. Cotten, 471 F.2d 744 (9th Cir. 1973). 
 
 257. Id. at 749. 
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years about a potential terrorist attack—likely with chemical or 
biological weapons. Nevertheless, military officials stubbornly 
contended that the U.S. military had only the resources to fulfill its 
traditional duties, much less take on new responsibilities.258 “The 
problem is concurrency,” said Army Secretary Thomas E. White.259  
No one has let us out of our obligations in Kosovo, in Bosnia, 
in the Sinai, in Korea. The Army is fully deployed in 100 
different countries, supporting our regional commanders in 
chief. And we are hard pressed to do that which the Army is 
principally organized to do. So we don’t need to volunteer for 
any other tasks.260  
Resources for these primary missions were so scarce that the Defense 
Science Board, as part of a summer 2000 study, advised that less than 
two percent of the defense and intelligence community budget should 
be devoted to protecting the continental United States against 
biological, chemical, information, and unconventional military 
attacks, and for providing civil and counterdrug support.261 Most of 
the defense resources delegated to civil authorities were heavily 
weighted towards managing a terrorist attack with weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), and were authorized only if they did not 
interfere with the military’s primary mission of “warfighting.”262 
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks dramatically changed 
the Pentagon’s priorities, as well as its place in American society. 
Within hours of the attacks, the DoD leapt into the role of homeland 
defense in a very public role. Air Force fighters flew continuous 
combat air patrols over New York City and Washington D.C., as well 
as other randomly selected cities or critical infrastructures.263 In the 
following months, NORAD intercepted more than 400 civilian 
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planes.264 On the ground, over 8,000 National Guard personnel 
watched over the nation’s major transportation hubs, standing guard 
at 435 airports.265 Though the Pentagon had previously shown little 
interest in protecting the nation’s “domestic battlespace,” between 
September 11, 2001 and January 23, 2002, the military spent $2.6 
billion dollars and mobilized 71,386 soldiers to active duty266 for that 
task alone. Army Secretary Thomas White, the Pentagon’s top officer 
on homeland security, summed up the military’s new strategy: 
“Homeland security is the number-one job for the United States 
military, and it has our full attention.”267  
The military’s focus visibly shifted in April 2002, when President 
George W. Bush approved the revision of the military’s command 
structure.268 The revision included a new unified component 
command, the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). “This 
command will be responsible for homeland defense and for assisting 
civil authorities in accordance with U.S. law. . . . The commander of 
Northern Command will update plans to provide military support to 
domestic civil authorities in response to natural and man-made 
disasters and during national emergencies.”269 NORTHCOM was 
scheduled to begin operation in October 2002, and will cover the 
continental United States, Canada, Mexico, and areas as far as 500 
miles off U.S. shores.270  
Under budgetary pressure from Congress, the Pentagon had 
already developed much of its training and doctrine for responding to 
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a domestic emergency.271 Much of this was done in anticipation of 
any future terrorist attack—especially one using WMD, such as 
chemical, biological, or nuclear agents.272 By law, the primary 
authority to prevent and respond to the crime of terrorism is within 
the Department of Justice, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”) as the lead federal operational agency.273 The FBI, through 
the Attorney General, may request assistance from the DoD.274 This 
aid may come in a variety of forms, such as the loaning of equipment 
for when a crisis has overwhelmed the FBI’s resources and threatens 
continuity of government.275  
The DoD’s involvement is required by Section 104 of the U.S.A. 
Patriot Act, which authorizes their use in “case of attack with a 
weapon of mass destruction.”276 DoD also remains responsible for 
training civilian “first responders” (fire, police, and emergency 
medical services) in WMD procedures, as well as maintaining a 
“domestic terrorism rapid response team” for the immediate support 
of law enforcement.277 The Secretary of Defense is the final 
approving authority for the most sensitive requests, such as for forces 
that are already assigned to component commanders, the military’s 
response to civil disorder or acts of terrorism, or any involvement that 
might cause a confrontation or use of lethal force.278 The Secretary 
approval authority for all other events, such as natural or manmade 
disasters, is delegated to the Secretary of the Army. 279  
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Although the events of September 11, 2001, and the sudden 
importance of homeland security, have raised the military’s profile in 
civil affairs, there have been proposals in Congress to amend the 
PCA to provide the military with even more leeway in waging the 
“war on terrorism.” These proposals parallel many of the same 
arguments that are used to justify the war on drugs. Senator John 
Warner, the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, proposed the first change. In an October 4, 2002, 
Congressional hearing, he suggested that “the reasons for the Posse 
Comitatus Act have long given way to the changed lifestyle we face 
today here in America.”280 He continued in a letter to Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld: “Our way of life has forever changed . . . should 
this law now be changed to enable our active-duty military to more 
fully join other domestic assets in this war against terrorism?”281  
Similarly, President Bush, in his National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, outlined his intent to at least review the PCA. “The threat of 
catastrophic terrorism requires a thorough review of the laws 
permitting the military to act within the United States in order to 
determine whether domestic preparedness and response efforts would 
benefit from greater involvement of military personnel and, if so, 
how.”282 General Ralph E. Eberhart, the Commander of U.S. 
Northern Command, indicated broad support for at least reviewing 
the PCA.283 Other officials, such as Senator Joseph R. Biden, 
advocate a much more dramatic revision of the law, giving soldiers 
the power to make arrests.284  
In contrast, several senior officials in the Bush Administration 
remain opposed to any suggestion of amending the PCA. The then-
Director of the Office of Homeland Defense, Tom Ridge, conceded 
General Eberhart’s suggestion that the PCA should be reviewed, but 
he opposed any change that would include arrest powers.285 He later 
 
 280. Leonard, supra note 267, at 2. 
 281. War Prompts Debate on Military Law, supra note 6. 
 282. OFFICE OF HOMELAND SECURITY, supra note 269, at 48. 
 283. Joyce Howard Price, Biden Backs Letting Soldiers Arrest Civilians, WASHINGTON 
TIMES, July 22, 2002 at 1. 
 284. Id. at 1. 
 285. Id. at 2. 
 https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol12/iss1/7
p 99 Canestaro book pages.doc  4/9/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]  Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse Comitatus 139 
 
dismissed the possibility of amending the PCA as “very unlikely.”286 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld also opposed the measure, 
saying that he “has not seen any reasons” why the PCA must be 
changed.287  
The degree of the military’s involvement will ultimately be 
decided in either the government’s homeland security288 plan or in the 
potential changes to posse comitatus. Such changes are uncertain, 
however, and continue to evolve at both the White House and on 
Capitol Hill. As of yet, the public has not appeared to notice that this 
debate could potentially bring change to a fundamental principle of 
American democracy. Part of this can certainly be attributed to a 
dissipation of the fear that Americans have historically harbored 
towards a standing army. The rehabilitation of the military in the 
public eye over the last 35 years has restored public faith in the 
motives and ability of the U.S. military. Building from the public 
scorn and rejection that followed the Vietnam years, the American 
military delivered dazzling victories in Grenada, Panama, the Gulf, 
and Afghanistan. A 1997 Gallup poll on the confidence of Americans 
in social institutions revealed that the U.S. military placed second, 
ranking behind only small businesses, and above the police, 
organized religion, and every other branch of the government.289 
Public confidence in the military surged to an impressive seventy-one 
percent after the 2001 terrorist attacks, but even beforehand it 
remained strong, registering at fifty-four percent in January 1999 and 
forty-four percent in January 2001.290 The public’s faith in the 
military is apparent in a number of ways. Where colonists or 
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confederates would have reviled in the presence of federal troops in 
previous generations, Los Angelinos during the 1992 Rodney King 
riots “smiled, waved, and beeped their car horns at passing convoys 
of soldiers.”291 Soldiers on airport duty during the fall of 2001 
reported that passengers bought them coffee or gave them home-
baked cookies.292 Although it is certainly heartening that Americans 
rally behind their service members, it is clear they are unaware of the 
dangers that “the founders knew first-hand.”293  
The military would rightfully contest any suggestion that their 
soldiers would either undermine American values or subvert our 
democracy. As Defense Secretary Rumsfeld bluntly stated, “[w]e had 
a lot of troops [supporting the Olympic Games in] Salt Lake City. We 
did not take over the state. We did not take over the city.”294 No one 
would contest the honor or patriotism of American soldiers, or 
suggest that they would deliberately work to undermine our system of 
government. The military, however, remains the tool of the 
policymaker, who is often more concerned with ends than means. 
Meanwhile, the mission, goals, and responsibilities of the federal 
bureaucratic machine seem to evolve in response to its own needs 
and priorities. In Laird v. Tatum, following President Kennedy’s 
private criticism of the Army for failing to suppress the Mississippi 
riots, the domestic military surveillance system was challenged not 
out of a “mischievous desire to violate privacy or liberties of 
Americans,” but because of “the bureaucratic reflex not to be caught 
short again.”295 
Considerable differences exist between a soldier and peace 
officer. Soldiers are trained to fight and kill, without concern for the 
rights of the individual or for constitutional protections against illegal 
searches, seizures, or arrests. The military’s rules of engagement 
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carry no due process, no consideration of civil right, and smack of an 
underlying presumption of guilt.296 The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in Bissonette v. Haig,297 expounded on the inherent risks of 
employing the military in law enforcement: 
Civilian rule is basic to our system of government. The use of 
military forces to seize civilians can expose civilian 
government to the threat of military rule and the suspension of 
constitutional liberties. On a lesser scale, military enforcement 
of the civil law leaves the protection of vital fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights in the hands of persons who are not trained 
to uphold these rights. It may also chill the exercise of 
fundamental rights, such as the rights to speak freely and to 
vote, and create the atmosphere of fear and hostility which 
exists in territories occupied by enemy forces.298 
No matter how well the loosening of military restrictions are 
received by the public, the abuse of civil liberties seems to always 
follow. In 1863, the Army quelled draft riots in New York, while a 
violent military suppression of the 1877 railroad strike resulted in 100 
killed, and several hundred wounded.299 In the 1894 Pullman strike, 
the President ordered in federal troops over the opposition of the 
Governor of Illinois,300 while the Army detained some of the 
demonstrators in the 1899 miner’s strike at Couer d’Alene, Idaho, 
without charging them with a crime.301 During World War I, the 
military broke up labor protests and spied on Union leaders, 
“substantially slow[ing] unionization for a decade.”302  
These incidents—only a select few out of scores in American 
history—demonstrate how badly civilian authority can abuse the 
military to the detriment of the citizens’ rights. A string of incidents 
in recent years is indicative that the military—no matter how 
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respected in the eyes of the public—still holds potential for abuse. 
The shooting death of Esequiel Hernandez, a Mexican goat-herder, at 
the hands of inadequately trained Marine Corps,303 demonstrates the 
risks of employing infantry in law enforcement roles.  
An analysis of the national strategy for Homeland Defense’s 
definition of terrorism reveals an equal potential for abuse: “Any 
premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public welfare 
that is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or 
governments.”304 Furthermore, it is frightening to imply that any 
domestic crime with an underlying political motive, “intended to 
coerce governments,” will equate with an act of terrorism and thus be 
subject to military intervention. Such involvement is only one step 
removed from Justice Douglas’s dire warning in Laird v. Tatum: 
“Whenever you conclude that it is right to use the Army to execute 
civil process . . . it is no longer a government founded upon the 
consent of the people; it has become a government of force.”305  
V. CONCLUSION 
Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little 
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.306  
Posse comitatus, as a bar against the military’s enforcement of 
civil law, stretches back to the roots of American jurisprudence in 
English common law. After suffering decades of abuse and injustice 
at the hands of the Tudor and Stuart monarchs, the English knew very 
well of the consequences resulting from an unrestrained military 
presence in domestic affairs. Although this knowledge was impressed 
upon the psyche of our own nation as a result of similar tactics 
employed by British occupation forces, the principle has undergone a 
steady decline. The United States has slowly shifted away from 
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Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for 
Posse Comitatus 
Nathan Canestaro* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whoever, except in cases under circumstances expressly 
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully 
uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or 
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined [under this title] or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.1 
Since its enactment in 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act (“PCA”) has 
upheld a basic value of American democracy—the principle that the 
military cannot enforce civilian law. This principle, derived from a 
long tradition of antimilitarism in English common law, represents 
the “traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military 
intrusion into civilian affairs.”2 Despite its status as a “fundamental 
tenet of our system of law,”3 the PCA has lain in obscurity for much 
of its existence. Derided by one court as an “obscure and all-but-
forgotten statute,”4 and “backwash of the Reconstruction period,”5 its 
criminal sanctions have never been enforced during its 120-year 
history. In the limited number of cases where the PCA has undergone 
judicial review, it has often appeared in defense attorneys’ creative—
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and almost entirely unsuccessful—motions to contest the 
prosecution’s jurisdiction, to suppress evidence, or to invalidate 
government action.  
The effectiveness of the PCA has declined over the course of the 
last thirty years. Legislative pressure, a lack of judicial enforcement, 
and numerous exceptions have taken their toll on the PCA’s strength. 
An increased public confidence in the military and judicial deference 
to military actions have undermined the principles upon which the 
PCA was founded. Accordingly, this has increased the Department of 
Defense’s (“DoD”) legal freedom to domestically intervene. In the 
wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the military’s place 
in homeland security has become a major national issue. Even before 
the attacks, the DoD played a major supporting role in counter-drug 
efforts and in formulating a response to potential chemical or 
biological terrorist attacks. Since the attacks, the military has 
dramatically widened the scope of its domestic activities. For the first 
time, combat aircraft patrolled the skies over major American cities 
while uniformed troops stood guard in the nation’s airports. The 
troops and jets have now been withdrawn. Yet the creation of a new 
military command for the sole purpose of homeland defense indicates 
the intention of the armed forces to remain engaged in that role.  
With the groundswell of public support for the war against 
terrorism, the decay of posse comitatus has accelerated dramatically. 
Some politicians and media sources now suggest that Congress 
amend or even repeal the PCA to allow a degree of domestic military 
involvement that would have been unthinkable five years ago.6 
Although there is undoubtedly a certain pragmatism in levying the 
immense resources of the U.S. military against the threat of domestic 
terrorism, this strategy ignores the consequences of using soldiers as 
a substitute for civilian law enforcement. The military is not a police 
force; it is trained to engage and destroy the enemy, not to protect 
constitutional rights. The founding fathers feared the involvement of 
the Army in the nation’s affairs for good reason. History has 
demonstrated that employing soldiers to enforce the law is inherently 
dangerous to the rights of the people. 
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factors of the McArthur test.215 In Yunis, the district court relied on 
McArthur’s “regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory” standard, 
holding that “a power regulatory . . . controls or directs, . . . a power 
proscriptive in nature . . . prohibits or condemns, . . . and a power 
compulsory in nature exerts some coercive force.”216  
The contradictory decisions in Red Feather, Jamarillo, and 
McArthur threw the understanding of the PCA into disarray. 
Specifically, issues arose among both the military and civil 
authorities as to what comprised an actual violation of the PCA and 
to what degree the military can assist civil authorities. Although the 
government successfully defeated in the posse comitatus defense in 
both Red Feather and McArthur, the substantial differences in the 
three decisions cast doubt onto the boundaries of PCA violations.  
The 1981 amendments to the PCA were intended to resolve much 
of this confusion. To pave the way for a DoD role in the “war on 
drugs,” Congress established clear legislative guidance on what sort 
of assistance was permissible. Congress adopted Red Feather’s 
“active versus passive” standard, allowing the government 
considerable freedom to provide military assistance to local 
authorities.217 By defining the prohibited “active” measures, such as 
search, seizure, and arrest, the first three sections of the 1981 
amendments clearly favored the Red Feather holding. These 
provisions allowed the DoD to provide many of the same sorts of 
passive aid that had been challenged in the Wounded Knee cases: 
providing equipment, supplies, technical assistance, intelligence, and 
training.  
The DOD’s directives, issued subsequent to the PCA’s 
amendments, were also in line with the Wounded Knee decisions. 
These decisions adopted the McArthur test as a supplemental 
standard for determining an improper level of military assistance. By 
establishing that the Navy or Marine Corps are potentially exempt 
from the PCA, the directives require the Secretary of Defense’s 
approval before either service engages in the “interdiction of a vessel 
or aircraft, a law enforcement search or seizure, an arrest, 
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apprehension, or other activity that is likely to subject civilians to the 
use of military power that is regulatory, prescriptive or 
compulsory.”218 
D. Pushing the Boundaries of the PCA: Defining PCA Violations and 
Applying an Exclusionary Rule 
Over the years, defense attorneys have pressed courts to 
strengthen the PCA by adopting an exclusionary rule for evidence 
obtained by military personnel who are acting in violation of its 
terms. The courts have been very reluctant to broaden the powers of 
the PCA beyond its strict interpretation as a criminal statute. Relying 
heavily on a narrow view of both the statutory language and the 
legislative record, the courts have almost unanimously avoided the 
question by not finding a PCA violation. More interestingly, they 
have also refused to enforce an exclusionary rule, even in the face of 
clear violations. The judiciary’s resistance to broadening the PCA’s 
protections is significant, because it demonstrates the courts’ 
continuing deference to military activity and unwillingness to 
counterbalance the increasing exceptions to the PCA with substantial 
evidentiary power. 
Historically, many PCA-related cases arose from the “best of 
intentions.” These include the base commanders’ efforts to help their 
civilian counterparts in criminal investigations or in military asset 
loans to pursue and capture escaped convicts.219 One scholar 
describes the historical trend as the military’s “understandable 
temptation to help the local authorities, born of morality and the 
desire for good public relations.”220 The author notes that such 
“temptation may lead to subterfuge,”221 when military personnel who 
are eager to help invent excuses to intervene in violation of beyond 
the PCA mandates.  
In the 1981 PCA amendments, Congress explicitly encouraged the 
military to perform training exercises for assisting law enforcement, 
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but only as “an incidental aspect of training performed for a military 
purpose.”222 For example, the congressional record suggests that “the 
scheduling of routine training missions can easily accommodate the 
need for improved intelligence information covering drug trafficking 
in the Caribbean.”223 This instruction provides a considerable 
opportunity for the military to circumvent the PCA. In effect, holding 
riot control training in an area beset by civil disorder,224 or 
conducting infantry field exercises in a forest where a convict is on 
the run,225 stretches the PCA to its breaking point. Major Furman 
condemns such trickery “as violative of both the letter and the spirit 
of the law.”226 Department of the Navy regulations sternly warn that 
ostensibly military-directed activities should not be used as a 
“subterfuge” to provide covert assistance.227  
As a result of these ambiguities, judicial analysis of military 
assistance to civilians has often turned on either the military purpose 
doctrine or the degree of military personnel involvement. Under the 
military purpose doctrine, military action that enforces civil law is 
legitimate when its primary purpose will either further a military 
function or enforce the Uniform Code of Military Justice, “regardless 
of the incidental benefits to civilian authorities.”228 This includes 
military law enforcement cases where there is reasonable ground to 
believe that a crime is related to military personnel, or when a 
civilian commits a crime that affects a military installation.229  
A series of cases have upheld the validity of military 
investigations on the basis of the military purpose doctrine.230 In 
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United States v. Hartley, the defendants were under contract to sell 
shrimp to the DoD.231 A military investigation revealed that the 
defendants tampered with samples of their products in order to 
conceal the fact that their goods were substandard. The defendants 
claimed that the indictment should be dismissed because the Air 
Force investigators were operating in violation of the PCA.232 The 
court denied the defendants’ motion, holding that the investigation 
“involved military personnel . . . performing functions they would 
normally perform in the course of their duties.”233  
The Eleventh Circuit used a similar line of reasoning in United 
States v. Bacon.234 In Bacon, the military’s investigative service, the 
Criminal Investigation Division (“CID”), and the Georgia Bureau of 
Investigation, conducted a joint investigation that culminated when 
an undercover military investigator made a covert purchase from the 
defendant. Considering the military’s level of involvement in the 
investigation, the Bacon court ruled that there was no violation of the 
PCA.235 The military investigator assisted his civilian counterparts 
“only to the extent of activities normally performed in the ordinary 
course of his duties,”236 with no evident “military permeation of 
civilian law enforcement.”237  
In finding PCA violations, the courts also considered the breadth 
of participation by military personnel in their law enforcement 
duties.238 Under this standard, a violation during the military’s 
investigation is potentially indicated by the arrest of civilians, 
soldiers drawing their weapons in the course of their investigation, 
and the search, seizure, or administrative handling of suspects and 
evidence during arrest.239 In United States v. Yunis,240 the defendant, a 
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Lebanese hijacker, argued that the FBI committed a posse comitatus 
violation after it captured him overseas and transferred him to Navy 
custody for transport back to the United States. The court dismissed 
his argument, rehashing the Wounded Knee decisions to find that the 
Navy may only provide indirect assistance when it does not constitute 
“the exercise of regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory power.”241 
Further, the court held that such action does not “amount to direct 
active involvement in the execution of the laws,”242 or “pervade the 
activities of civilian authorities.”243 In North Carolina v. Trueblood, 
the state court of appeals found no PCA violation where an Army 
criminal investigations officer rode as a passenger in a police car, 
wore no uniform, carried no weapon, and merely provided the police 
officer with the name and address of the suspect, an officer in the 
Army.244  
Even when the courts have found a violation of the PCA, they 
have still been surprisingly reluctant to enforce an exclusionary rule. 
The PCA does not provide that evidence gathered in violation of its 
terms is inadmissible. However, the congressional record indicates 
that the PCA was intended solely as a punitive measure against 
soldiers or civilians who would use the military to enforce a political 
agenda. The leading precedent in this line of cases, United States v. 
Walden,245 noted that “[the PCA] expresses a policy that is for the 
benefit of the people as a whole, but not one that may be fairly 
characterized as expressly designed to protect the personal rights” of 
individual citizens.246 Similarly, in State v. Pattioay,247 the Hawaiian 
Supreme Court ruled that the PCA is not “analogous” to 
constitutional rights. The court stated that the evidence must be 
suppressed when such rights are violated, as the PCA creates no such 
freedom for military investigations.248 
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In Walden, the Fourth Circuit opted not to impose the 
“extraordinary remedy”249 of an exclusionary rule. Relying on both 
the relative obscurity of the rule and the limited number of reported 
violations, the court concluded that “[s]hould there be evidence of 
widespread or repeated violations . . . we will . . . consider whether 
adoption of an exclusionary rule is required as a future deterrent.”250 
Most courts have followed Walden’s lead.251 In United States v. 
Wolffs,252 the Fifth Circuit deferred from resolving the case on PCA 
grounds. Instead, the court held that even if the involvement of a CID 
investigator who is acting as an informant for local law enforcement 
would violate the PCA, it would still refrain from applying the 
exclusionary rule. The court stated unequivocally that only if they 
were “confronted in the future with widespread and repeated 
violations of the Posse Comitatus Act, . . . [would] . . . an 
exclusionary rule . . . be fashioned at that time.”253 The court in 
United States v. Roberts254 came to a similar holding, observing that 
the courts have “uniformly refused to apply the exclusionary rule to 
evidence seized in violation of the Posse Comitatus Act.”255 In United 
States v. Cotton,256 the Ninth Circuit denied the application of the 
exclusionary rule by simply stating that “the remedy requested 
exceeds that required by the conduct.”257  
IV. HOMELAND DEFENSE: ENDS JUSTIFYING MEANS 
Homeland defense and domestic security was not a priority for the 
U.S. military before the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks. Many 
senior officials in the intelligence community and the Bush and 
Clinton Administrations had been warning the military for several 
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years about a potential terrorist attack—likely with chemical or 
biological weapons. Nevertheless, military officials stubbornly 
contended that the U.S. military had only the resources to fulfill its 
traditional duties, much less take on new responsibilities.258 “The 
problem is concurrency,” said Army Secretary Thomas E. White.259  
No one has let us out of our obligations in Kosovo, in Bosnia, 
in the Sinai, in Korea. The Army is fully deployed in 100 
different countries, supporting our regional commanders in 
chief. And we are hard pressed to do that which the Army is 
principally organized to do. So we don’t need to volunteer for 
any other tasks.260  
Resources for these primary missions were so scarce that the Defense 
Science Board, as part of a summer 2000 study, advised that less than 
two percent of the defense and intelligence community budget should 
be devoted to protecting the continental United States against 
biological, chemical, information, and unconventional military 
attacks, and for providing civil and counterdrug support.261 Most of 
the defense resources delegated to civil authorities were heavily 
weighted towards managing a terrorist attack with weapons of mass 
destruction (WMD), and were authorized only if they did not 
interfere with the military’s primary mission of “warfighting.”262 
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks dramatically changed 
the Pentagon’s priorities, as well as its place in American society. 
Within hours of the attacks, the DoD leapt into the role of homeland 
defense in a very public role. Air Force fighters flew continuous 
combat air patrols over New York City and Washington D.C., as well 
as other randomly selected cities or critical infrastructures.263 In the 
following months, NORAD intercepted more than 400 civilian 
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planes.264 On the ground, over 8,000 National Guard personnel 
watched over the nation’s major transportation hubs, standing guard 
at 435 airports.265 Though the Pentagon had previously shown little 
interest in protecting the nation’s “domestic battlespace,” between 
September 11, 2001 and January 23, 2002, the military spent $2.6 
billion dollars and mobilized 71,386 soldiers to active duty266 for that 
task alone. Army Secretary Thomas White, the Pentagon’s top officer 
on homeland security, summed up the military’s new strategy: 
“Homeland security is the number-one job for the United States 
military, and it has our full attention.”267  
The military’s focus visibly shifted in April 2002, when President 
George W. Bush approved the revision of the military’s command 
structure.268 The revision included a new unified component 
command, the U.S. Northern Command (NORTHCOM). “This 
command will be responsible for homeland defense and for assisting 
civil authorities in accordance with U.S. law. . . . The commander of 
Northern Command will update plans to provide military support to 
domestic civil authorities in response to natural and man-made 
disasters and during national emergencies.”269 NORTHCOM was 
scheduled to begin operation in October 2002, and will cover the 
continental United States, Canada, Mexico, and areas as far as 500 
miles off U.S. shores.270  
Under budgetary pressure from Congress, the Pentagon had 
already developed much of its training and doctrine for responding to 
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a domestic emergency.271 Much of this was done in anticipation of 
any future terrorist attack—especially one using WMD, such as 
chemical, biological, or nuclear agents.272 By law, the primary 
authority to prevent and respond to the crime of terrorism is within 
the Department of Justice, with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(“FBI”) as the lead federal operational agency.273 The FBI, through 
the Attorney General, may request assistance from the DoD.274 This 
aid may come in a variety of forms, such as the loaning of equipment 
for when a crisis has overwhelmed the FBI’s resources and threatens 
continuity of government.275  
The DoD’s involvement is required by Section 104 of the U.S.A. 
Patriot Act, which authorizes their use in “case of attack with a 
weapon of mass destruction.”276 DoD also remains responsible for 
training civilian “first responders” (fire, police, and emergency 
medical services) in WMD procedures, as well as maintaining a 
“domestic terrorism rapid response team” for the immediate support 
of law enforcement.277 The Secretary of Defense is the final 
approving authority for the most sensitive requests, such as for forces 
that are already assigned to component commanders, the military’s 
response to civil disorder or acts of terrorism, or any involvement that 
might cause a confrontation or use of lethal force.278 The Secretary 
approval authority for all other events, such as natural or manmade 
disasters, is delegated to the Secretary of the Army. 279  
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Although the events of September 11, 2001, and the sudden 
importance of homeland security, have raised the military’s profile in 
civil affairs, there have been proposals in Congress to amend the 
PCA to provide the military with even more leeway in waging the 
“war on terrorism.” These proposals parallel many of the same 
arguments that are used to justify the war on drugs. Senator John 
Warner, the ranking Republican on the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, proposed the first change. In an October 4, 2002, 
Congressional hearing, he suggested that “the reasons for the Posse 
Comitatus Act have long given way to the changed lifestyle we face 
today here in America.”280 He continued in a letter to Defense 
Secretary Rumsfeld: “Our way of life has forever changed . . . should 
this law now be changed to enable our active-duty military to more 
fully join other domestic assets in this war against terrorism?”281  
Similarly, President Bush, in his National Strategy for Homeland 
Security, outlined his intent to at least review the PCA. “The threat of 
catastrophic terrorism requires a thorough review of the laws 
permitting the military to act within the United States in order to 
determine whether domestic preparedness and response efforts would 
benefit from greater involvement of military personnel and, if so, 
how.”282 General Ralph E. Eberhart, the Commander of U.S. 
Northern Command, indicated broad support for at least reviewing 
the PCA.283 Other officials, such as Senator Joseph R. Biden, 
advocate a much more dramatic revision of the law, giving soldiers 
the power to make arrests.284  
In contrast, several senior officials in the Bush Administration 
remain opposed to any suggestion of amending the PCA. The then-
Director of the Office of Homeland Defense, Tom Ridge, conceded 
General Eberhart’s suggestion that the PCA should be reviewed, but 
he opposed any change that would include arrest powers.285 He later 
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dismissed the possibility of amending the PCA as “very unlikely.”286 
Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld also opposed the measure, 
saying that he “has not seen any reasons” why the PCA must be 
changed.287  
The degree of the military’s involvement will ultimately be 
decided in either the government’s homeland security288 plan or in the 
potential changes to posse comitatus. Such changes are uncertain, 
however, and continue to evolve at both the White House and on 
Capitol Hill. As of yet, the public has not appeared to notice that this 
debate could potentially bring change to a fundamental principle of 
American democracy. Part of this can certainly be attributed to a 
dissipation of the fear that Americans have historically harbored 
towards a standing army. The rehabilitation of the military in the 
public eye over the last 35 years has restored public faith in the 
motives and ability of the U.S. military. Building from the public 
scorn and rejection that followed the Vietnam years, the American 
military delivered dazzling victories in Grenada, Panama, the Gulf, 
and Afghanistan. A 1997 Gallup poll on the confidence of Americans 
in social institutions revealed that the U.S. military placed second, 
ranking behind only small businesses, and above the police, 
organized religion, and every other branch of the government.289 
Public confidence in the military surged to an impressive seventy-one 
percent after the 2001 terrorist attacks, but even beforehand it 
remained strong, registering at fifty-four percent in January 1999 and 
forty-four percent in January 2001.290 The public’s faith in the 
military is apparent in a number of ways. Where colonists or 
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confederates would have reviled in the presence of federal troops in 
previous generations, Los Angelinos during the 1992 Rodney King 
riots “smiled, waved, and beeped their car horns at passing convoys 
of soldiers.”291 Soldiers on airport duty during the fall of 2001 
reported that passengers bought them coffee or gave them home-
baked cookies.292 Although it is certainly heartening that Americans 
rally behind their service members, it is clear they are unaware of the 
dangers that “the founders knew first-hand.”293  
The military would rightfully contest any suggestion that their 
soldiers would either undermine American values or subvert our 
democracy. As Defense Secretary Rumsfeld bluntly stated, “[w]e had 
a lot of troops [supporting the Olympic Games in] Salt Lake City. We 
did not take over the state. We did not take over the city.”294 No one 
would contest the honor or patriotism of American soldiers, or 
suggest that they would deliberately work to undermine our system of 
government. The military, however, remains the tool of the 
policymaker, who is often more concerned with ends than means. 
Meanwhile, the mission, goals, and responsibilities of the federal 
bureaucratic machine seem to evolve in response to its own needs 
and priorities. In Laird v. Tatum, following President Kennedy’s 
private criticism of the Army for failing to suppress the Mississippi 
riots, the domestic military surveillance system was challenged not 
out of a “mischievous desire to violate privacy or liberties of 
Americans,” but because of “the bureaucratic reflex not to be caught 
short again.”295 
Considerable differences exist between a soldier and peace 
officer. Soldiers are trained to fight and kill, without concern for the 
rights of the individual or for constitutional protections against illegal 
searches, seizures, or arrests. The military’s rules of engagement 
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carry no due process, no consideration of civil right, and smack of an 
underlying presumption of guilt.296 The Eighth Circuit Court of 
Appeals, in Bissonette v. Haig,297 expounded on the inherent risks of 
employing the military in law enforcement: 
Civilian rule is basic to our system of government. The use of 
military forces to seize civilians can expose civilian 
government to the threat of military rule and the suspension of 
constitutional liberties. On a lesser scale, military enforcement 
of the civil law leaves the protection of vital fourth and Fifth 
Amendment rights in the hands of persons who are not trained 
to uphold these rights. It may also chill the exercise of 
fundamental rights, such as the rights to speak freely and to 
vote, and create the atmosphere of fear and hostility which 
exists in territories occupied by enemy forces.298 
No matter how well the loosening of military restrictions are 
received by the public, the abuse of civil liberties seems to always 
follow. In 1863, the Army quelled draft riots in New York, while a 
violent military suppression of the 1877 railroad strike resulted in 100 
killed, and several hundred wounded.299 In the 1894 Pullman strike, 
the President ordered in federal troops over the opposition of the 
Governor of Illinois,300 while the Army detained some of the 
demonstrators in the 1899 miner’s strike at Couer d’Alene, Idaho, 
without charging them with a crime.301 During World War I, the 
military broke up labor protests and spied on Union leaders, 
“substantially slow[ing] unionization for a decade.”302  
These incidents—only a select few out of scores in American 
history—demonstrate how badly civilian authority can abuse the 
military to the detriment of the citizens’ rights. A string of incidents 
in recent years is indicative that the military—no matter how 
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respected in the eyes of the public—still holds potential for abuse. 
The shooting death of Esequiel Hernandez, a Mexican goat-herder, at 
the hands of inadequately trained Marine Corps,303 demonstrates the 
risks of employing infantry in law enforcement roles.  
An analysis of the national strategy for Homeland Defense’s 
definition of terrorism reveals an equal potential for abuse: “Any 
premeditated, unlawful act dangerous to human life or public welfare 
that is intended to intimidate or coerce civilian populations or 
governments.”304 Furthermore, it is frightening to imply that any 
domestic crime with an underlying political motive, “intended to 
coerce governments,” will equate with an act of terrorism and thus be 
subject to military intervention. Such involvement is only one step 
removed from Justice Douglas’s dire warning in Laird v. Tatum: 
“Whenever you conclude that it is right to use the Army to execute 
civil process . . . it is no longer a government founded upon the 
consent of the people; it has become a government of force.”305  
V. CONCLUSION 
Those who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little 
temporary safety deserve neither liberty nor safety.306  
Posse comitatus, as a bar against the military’s enforcement of 
civil law, stretches back to the roots of American jurisprudence in 
English common law. After suffering decades of abuse and injustice 
at the hands of the Tudor and Stuart monarchs, the English knew very 
well of the consequences resulting from an unrestrained military 
presence in domestic affairs. Although this knowledge was impressed 
upon the psyche of our own nation as a result of similar tactics 
employed by British occupation forces, the principle has undergone a 
steady decline. The United States has slowly shifted away from 
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Homeland Defense: Another Nail in the Coffin for 
Posse Comitatus 
Nathan Canestaro* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Whoever, except in cases under circumstances expressly 
authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully 
uses any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comitatus or 
otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined [under this title] or 
imprisoned not more than two years, or both.1 
Since its enactment in 1878, the Posse Comitatus Act (“PCA”) has 
upheld a basic value of American democracy—the principle that the 
military cannot enforce civilian law. This principle, derived from a 
long tradition of antimilitarism in English common law, represents 
the “traditional and strong resistance of Americans to any military 
intrusion into civilian affairs.”2 Despite its status as a “fundamental 
tenet of our system of law,”3 the PCA has lain in obscurity for much 
of its existence. Derided by one court as an “obscure and all-but-
forgotten statute,”4 and “backwash of the Reconstruction period,”5 its 
criminal sanctions have never been enforced during its 120-year 
history. In the limited number of cases where the PCA has undergone 
judicial review, it has often appeared in defense attorneys’ creative—
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 1. 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (1982). 
 2. Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 15 (1972). 
 3. People v. Burden, 288 N.W.2d 392, 397 (Mich. Ct. App. 1979). 
 4. Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 936 (1st Cir. 1948). 
 5. Id.  
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and almost entirely unsuccessful—motions to contest the 
prosecution’s jurisdiction, to suppress evidence, or to invalidate 
government action.  
The effectiveness of the PCA has declined over the course of the 
last thirty years. Legislative pressure, a lack of judicial enforcement, 
and numerous exceptions have taken their toll on the PCA’s strength. 
An increased public confidence in the military and judicial deference 
to military actions have undermined the principles upon which the 
PCA was founded. Accordingly, this has increased the Department of 
Defense’s (“DoD”) legal freedom to domestically intervene. In the 
wake of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, the military’s place 
in homeland security has become a major national issue. Even before 
the attacks, the DoD played a major supporting role in counter-drug 
efforts and in formulating a response to potential chemical or 
biological terrorist attacks. Since the attacks, the military has 
dramatically widened the scope of its domestic activities. For the first 
time, combat aircraft patrolled the skies over major American cities 
while uniformed troops stood guard in the nation’s airports. The 
troops and jets have now been withdrawn. Yet the creation of a new 
military command for the sole purpose of homeland defense indicates 
the intention of the armed forces to remain engaged in that role.  
With the groundswell of public support for the war against 
terrorism, the decay of posse comitatus has accelerated dramatically. 
Some politicians and media sources now suggest that Congress 
amend or even repeal the PCA to allow a degree of domestic military 
involvement that would have been unthinkable five years ago.6 
Although there is undoubtedly a certain pragmatism in levying the 
immense resources of the U.S. military against the threat of domestic 
terrorism, this strategy ignores the consequences of using soldiers as 
a substitute for civilian law enforcement. The military is not a police 
force; it is trained to engage and destroy the enemy, not to protect 
constitutional rights. The founding fathers feared the involvement of 
the Army in the nation’s affairs for good reason. History has 
demonstrated that employing soldiers to enforce the law is inherently 
dangerous to the rights of the people. 
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This Article will prove that the “War on Terrorism” will 
undermine the PCA. The “War on Drugs” has already eroded the 
PCA, but the “War on Terrorism” could be fatal to it. First, this 
Article will examine the roots of the principle of posse comitatus in 
English Common Law, and in the context of Colonial America and 
the post-Reconstruction period. This Article will establish that a 
separation of the civil and military spheres, specifically by 
prohibiting the military’s enforcement of civil law, is a fundamental 
value upon which the United States was founded. It will show how 
this prohibition has been slowly eroding since early in this nation’s 
history. Focusing on the civil abuses of posse comitatus during the 
Reconstruction period will demonstrate the consequences of 
unchecked domestic military power.  
Next, this Article will turn to the 1981 and 1988 Drug War 
amendments to the PCA to show that Congress has demonstrated its 
intent to levy the military’s resources against society’s problems, 
even over the DoD’s objections to extend their duties beyond their 
role as the nation’s “warfighter.” This Article will then examine each 
of the exceptions to the PCA to prove that substantial exceptions 
have seriously weakened it. Building on narrow judicial 
interpretations of the PCA, Congress has responded to modern 
national security threats such as drugs, terrorism, and weapons of 
mass destruction by giving the military a substantial support role. 
Beginning with the Wounded Knee standoff of 1973, the amount of 
military assistance that the PCA permits has risen dramatically. 
Meanwhile, the courts have been extremely reluctant to enforce 
violations to expand its scope beyond criminal sanctions. Finally, this 
Article will analyze the military’s growing role in homeland defense, 
and explore the consequences of the decline of posse comitatus.  
II. HISTORICAL ORIGINS OF POSSE COMITATUS 
A. English Common Law 
A Standing Army, however necessary it may be at some times, 
is always dangerous to the Liberties of the People. Soldiers are 
apt to consider themselves as a Body distinct from the rest of 
the Citizens. They have their Arms always in their hands . . . 
 Washington University Open Scholarship
p 99 Canestaro book pages.doc  4/9/03 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2003]  Another Nail in the Coffin for Posse Comitatus 143 
 
showing restraint in the domestic use of the military’s forces, and is 
now moving towards a more pragmatic approach that relies on the 
military’s vast resources as a means of law enforcement.  
Posse comitatus found legislative expression in response to 
military rule over the South during Reconstruction. Since then, 
however, legislative exceptions, a lack of judicial enforcement, 
blurring of the distinction between militia and regular military forces, 
and increased public confidence in the military have all taken their 
toll on the strength of the PCA. In recent years, this decline has 
become much more rapid. Congress responded to the increasing 
variety and sophistication of threats to national security by 
legislating—over the military’s objections—a quickly expanding role 
for them in emergency response, in WMD management, and in the 
War on Drugs.  
The PCA now contains substantial exceptions to allow military 
action. Narrowly-drafted restrictions on the forces and services 
included in the scope of the PCA allow some arms of the military a 
significant degree of freedom. The PCA permits indirect support 
measures—such as training, advising, and the loaning and operation 
of equipment—for all of the armed services. The judiciary, 
demonstrating their traditional deference to military activity, has 
undermined efforts to broaden the prohibitions of the PCA by 
including an exclusionary power. 
It now seems apparent that the federal government believes that it 
needs a wide degree of military intervention in order to protect the 
United States from continuing terrorist attacks. Taking to heart 
Alexander Hamilton’s warning about “fettering the government with 
restrictions that cannot be observed,”307 the military seems ready to 
take on a vast role in counter-terrorism. Congress is considering 
amending the law yet again to allow the Department of Defense even 
more freedom to intervene. With the tremendous support for military 
action and the overwhelming public demand for better homeland 
security, continued modification—either by legislation or by 
practice—will erode the PCA to the point where the exceptions 
swallow the rule. 
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Whether these changes are even needed—or effective—to prevent 
terrorism is a subject of debate. One thing is certain, however. If 
posse comitatus becomes a victim of the war against terrorism, civil 
liberties will suffer as a result. History has demonstrated time and 
again that the military is no substitute for law enforcement. Military 
personnel are not trained to protect constitutional rights in their 
pursuit of justice, nor do they practice the proper criminal procedure 
required by our courts. As Justice Douglas stated, “[T]he civil 
administration is the product of political processes rooted in the 
traditions of civil liberties and the rights of man. The military regime 
has a different expertise—that of war and combat. The civil 
administration brings to its task all of the great traditions embodied in 
the Bill of Rights. The military knows only short-cuts and 
substitutes.”308 
It seems our nation long ago began descending the slippery slope 
of domestic military intervention. Recent events have presented us 
with a final opportunity to stay our decline. Whether our government 
will chose to do so is not yet clear. The costs of continuing onward 
certainly are.  
 
 308. DOUGLAS, supra note 10, at 42. 
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